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THE EFFECTS OF DIRECTIONAL AUDIT GUIDANCE AND ESTIMATION 
UNCERTAINTY ON AUDITOR CONFIRMATION BIAS AND PROFESSIONAL 
SKEPTICISM WHEN EVALUATING FAIR VALUE ESTIMATES 
NORMA R. MONTAGUE 
ABSTRACT 
 
 In this study, I examine the effects of audit guidance and estimation uncertainty 
on auditors’ confirmation bias and professional skepticism when evaluating fair value 
estimates. Fair value estimation is becoming more prevalent in financial reporting 
frameworks, and regulators warn that fair value estimation presents higher risk of 
material misstatement when greater judgment in estimation is involved. In addition recent 
evidence from the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) indicates that 
some auditors may not be exercising sufficient professional skepticism when performing 
audit procedures in higher risk areas of the audit. Martin et al. (2006) suggest that it may 
be the audit standards themselves that orient auditors toward biased evaluation of 
management’s estimates, suggesting that such directional audit guidance leads to 
confirmation bias. Further, it is possible that because of auditors’ intolerance for 
ambiguity, that a greater degree of estimation uncertainty exacerbates the bias. Thus, I 
examine whether directional audit guidance (e.g., support management’s estimate, and 
oppose management’s estimate) versus non-directional audit guidance (e.g., develop own 
estimate) affects auditors’ confirmation bias differentially under varying degrees of 
 viii 
uncertainty (e.g., low vs. high), and the extent to which this bias increases or decreases 
professional skepticism. The results show that auditors exhibit the greatest confirmation 
bias when they are directed to oppose versus support management’s estimate or generate 
their own estimate, and that this bias increases the degree of professional skepticism 
exercised by auditors. Further, the greatest extent of confirmation bias resulted when 
auditors were directed to oppose management’s estimate and estimation uncertainty was 
high. This study sheds light on the effects of directional versus non-directional audit 
guidance in the presence of uncertainty and should be informative to standard setters and 
practitioners as they press forward in issuing new audit guidance related to the evaluation 
of fair value estimates. 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
 Recent movements towards increased fair value reporting have brought into 
question the reliability1
                                                 
1 Schipper (2005) defines reliability in terms of the FASB’s conceptual framework, as a combination of 
both verifiability and representational faithfulness. I use the terms “bias” and “reliability” interchangeably 
in regards to the representational faithfulness of the fair value estimate. 
 of fair value estimates, and consequently, the adequacy of audit 
guidance supporting the review of these estimates (e.g., International Standard on 
Auditing (ISA) 540). “In general, the U. S.-based research evidence suggests that 
disclosed fair value estimates for financial instruments include differing levels of 
reliability and that the variation in reliability is related to the extent to which fair value 
estimates include publicly observed markets-based information versus management-
produced fair value estimates” (AAA FASC 2005, 190). These findings validate a 
concern regarding potential for biased (i.e., unreliable) values, particularly as 
management applies a high degree of discretion in determining the fair value estimate. 
Potential costs, such as investor losses, associated with biased reporting (whether 
intentional or unintentional) underscore the need for independent auditors to objectively 
assess management’s estimates. Given that objective evaluation of evidence requires the 
auditor to exercise professional skepticism (AICPA 1997), it is imperative to examine 
whether auditors exercise professional skepticism in their evaluation of fair value 
estimates. It is also important to examine the guidance provided to auditors for examining 
fair values and to investigate unintentional consequences of such guidance.  
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Historically, we have relied on the audit function to enhance the reliability of 
management judgment as used in financial reporting; however, prior research shows that 
auditors are subject to their own biases when reviewing information received from 
management (Kennedy 1993, 1995; McDaniel and Kinney 1995; Earley et al. 2008). In 
practice, auditors typically receive summary information from management about 
account balances and financial disclosures. The auditors then must gather evidence 
regarding management’s reported values and disclosures to attest to the fairness of the 
information presented. In this process, management can be considered the “first mover” 
and the auditor the “second mover” (Earley et al. 2008), signifying that the auditor is 
predisposed to management’s values, thus making it more difficult for the auditor to 
make objective evaluations. This sequence of events can be particularly problematic 
when management’s reported values are optimistically biased, as can be the case with fair 
value estimates (Ramanna 2008; Mazza et al. 2008). Therefore it becomes imperative to 
evaluate the competence and objectivity of auditors who are charged with evaluating 
management’s fair value estimates (Martin et al. 2006; Penman 2007), as well as the 
extent to which auditors exercise professional skepticism when evaluating these 
estimates.  
Prior research shows that auditors suffer from various biases when making 
judgments about events with uncertain outcomes. For example, auditors have been shown 
to exhibit recency bias (e.g., Kennedy 1993), curse of knowledge bias (e.g., Kennedy 
1995), and confirmation bias (e.g., Kida 1984) in making going concern judgments. 
Research, however, has not investigated whether these biases manifest in evaluating fair 
value estimates. Fair value estimates present a challenge for auditors because of the 
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uncertainty involved in their estimation, and are unique from other estimates primarily 
because of their measurement objective. The measurement objective of many accounting 
estimates is to forecast the outcome of one or more transactions, events or conditions 
giving rise to the need for the accounting estimate (e.g., bad debts expense and contingent 
liabilities) (IAASB 2009). By comparison, the measurement objective of many fair value 
estimates is expressed in terms of the value of a current transaction or financial statement 
item based on market prices at the measurement date (IAASB 2009, 4).2
Fair value estimates are also unique from other accounting estimates due to the 
potential complexity involved in their estimation and the numerous assumptions that 
management makes in deriving these estimates. Additionally, due to the first 
mover/second mover effect, auditors do not evaluate the fair value estimates 
independently of management’s assumptions, allowing bias seeded in management’s 
assumptions to persist should the auditor fail to exercise sufficient professional 
skepticism. Currently, over 40 accounting standards within GAAP require or permit 
 Earley et al. 
(2008, 1463) classify fair value estimation as a “more unstructured” task because, unlike 
other tasks where the auditor can ultimately receive feedback about actual outcomes, the 
actual outcome of fair value estimation might not be available at the time of the audit 
report. Feedback regarding actual outcomes is difficult to discern as “any observed 
outcome is invariably affected by events or conditions subsequent to the date at which the 
measurement is estimated for purposes of the financial statements” (IAASB 2009, 5). 
Thus, errors in fair value estimations may go undetected until some time after the 
issuance of the audit report, if at all. 
                                                 
2 The applicable reporting framework may require fair value measurement based on an assumed 
hypothetical current transaction between knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm’s length transaction, 
rather than the settlement of a transaction at some past or future date (IAASB 2009, 4). 
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entities to use fair value measures (FASB 2006b), and as fair value becomes more 
prevalent in financial reporting biased estimations will have an increasingly pervasive 
effect on the overall fairness of the financial statements. 
In addressing the complexity involved in fair value estimation, the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 157 (FAS 157), Fair Value Measurements, which provides guidance for 
measuring and reporting fair value estimates (FVEs) in the financial statements and 
accompanying footnotes. While other standards have addressed fair value measurement, 
none has done so with as much specificity as FAS 157. FAS 157 is unique in the 
accounting literature in introducing and formalizing this estimate relative to other types 
of estimates (e.g., bad debts) (Trott 2009). Specifically, as part of its measurement 
framework, FAS 157 provides a fair value hierarchy that distinguishes between 
observable and unobservable inputs and recommends that valuation techniques should 
maximize the use of observable inputs and minimize the use of unobservable inputs 
(FASB 2006a, 10). Observable inputs are those that are based on market inputs obtained 
from sources independent of the entity, whereas unobservable inputs involve the entity’s 
own assessment of the market participants’ assumptions. The emphasis of FAS 157 on 
observable inputs is designed to curb both management’s incentive and opportunity to 
bias FVEs. However, as transactions requiring FVEs increase in uniqueness and 
complexity, management relies solely on its own assumptions in arriving at a FVE, 
increasing the opportunity for management bias. Management bias is defined in ISA 540 
as “a lack of neutrality by management in the preparation of information” (IAASB 2009, 
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5). Thus, management may intentionally or unintentionally bias the fair value estimate 
either upwards or downwards.  
The nature and reliability of information available to management when making 
fair value estimates varies widely, which consequently affects the degree of estimation 
uncertainty associated with such estimates (IAASB 2009). ISA 540 defines estimation 
uncertainty as “the susceptibility of an accounting estimate and related disclosures to an 
inherent lack of precision in its measurement” (IAASB 2009, 5). The degree of 
estimation uncertainty (hereafter, uncertainty), provides for a greater range of judgments 
allowing for increased susceptibility to management bias; this, in turn, enhances the risk 
of material misstatement of accounting estimates (AICPA 2001; IAASB 2009; PCAOB 
2009).  
Recently, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) Standing 
Advisory Group (SAG) disclosed that “information obtained from the PCAOB’s 
inspection and enforcement programs indicates that some auditors might not be 
exercising sufficient professional skepticism when performing audit procedures and 
evaluating results in higher risk areas of the audit” (PCAOB 2009, 2). Professional 
skepticism, which requires the auditor to adopt an attitude that includes a questioning 
mind and a critical assessment of audit evidence, is indicated by auditor judgments and 
decisions that reflect a heightened assessment of the risk that an assertion is incorrect 
(AICPA 1997; Nelson 2009). One way professional skepticism is reflected in a fair value 
setting is by the auditor’s judgment that management’s FVE is materially misstated, and 
the auditor’s decision to adjust the dollar amount of the reported value in a downward 
(conservative) direction. 
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Martin et al. (2006) suggest that it could be audit standards themselves which 
orient auditors toward biased evaluation of management estimates, resulting in 
insufficient professional skepticism. For example, AU Sec. 332.35, Auditing Derivative 
Instruments, Hedging Activities, and Investment in Securities, states that “the auditor 
should obtain evidence supporting management’s assertions about the fair value of 
derivatives and securities measured or disclosed at fair value” (AICPA 2000, emphasis 
added). Martin et al. (2006) suggest that directional guidance such as this could lead to a 
“confirmation bias” wherein the auditor searches for and gives greater weight to 
information that supports management’s estimates at the expense of relevant information 
that disconfirms management’s estimates. Kadous et al. (2008) note that “despite the 
prevalence of confirmation bias across decision settings and its potentially hazardous 
consequences, few studies have sought to identify situations in which confirmation bias is 
mitigated” (139). Following Kadous et al. (2008), Nelson (2009) suggests that future 
research should explore the underlying reasons for the prevalence of confirmation bias in 
auditing and calls for research investigating whether confirmation bias can be exploited 
in such a way as to promote professional skepticism via relatively simple means; i.e., 
reframing of the standards and professional guidance.  
1.2 Purpose and Research Questions  
 The purposes of this paper are to examine whether current (as well as alternate) 
audit guidance and uncertainty magnify confirmation bias in auditors and the extent to 
which this bias increases or decreases professional skepticism. Specifically, I examine 
whether directional audit guidance (i.e., support/oppose management’s estimate) versus 
non-directional audit guidance (i.e., develop own estimate) affects auditors’ confirmation 
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bias differentially under varying levels of uncertainty (i.e., low vs. high), and how this 
bias consequently affects professional skepticism.   
 The research questions are: 
(1) To what extent do auditors exhibit confirmation bias in evaluating 
management’s fair value estimates under directional and non-directional audit 
standards?   
(2) To what extent does estimation uncertainty affect the extent of confirmation 
bias exhibited by auditors when evaluating management’s fair value 
estimates? 
(3) Do the effects of audit guidance on confirmation bias depend on the extent of 
estimation uncertainty inherent in management’s fair value estimate? 
(4) Does confirmation bias affect the extent of professional skepticism exercised 
by auditors when evaluating management’s fair value estimates?   
1.3 Motivation   
The role of auditors requires judgment during all phases of the audit, including 
planning, information gathering, and evaluation. Low-quality judgments can have serious 
consequences not only for auditors, but also for their firms, individuals relying on the 
work of the auditors, society and the economy as a whole (Bonner 2008). For example, 
Nelson (2009) notes that lack of professional skepticism has been identified as a primary 
cause of audit failure (Carmichael and Craig 1996), a contributor to the majority of SEC 
enforcement actions (Beasley et al. 2001), and a primary contributor to malpractice 
claims against auditors (Anderson and Wolfe 2002). Thus, it is important to investigate 
factors, such as audit guidance and uncertainty, which could potentially impair the quality 
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of judgments. This research is timely and relevant as indicated by the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board’s (PCAOB) Standing Advisory Group (SAG) recent 
meeting to discuss the potential of a standards-setting project on auditing fair value 
measurements (PCAOB 2009).   
Auditors’ ability to objectively evaluate management’s FVEs is important for 
several reasons. First, inability to objectively evaluate management’s FVEs limits the 
extent to which users can rely on the corresponding financial statements. In the case of 
management-biased estimates, an orientation towards confirming evidence by the auditor 
increases the likelihood of undesirable outcomes because “potential risks and warning 
signals may be overlooked” (Jonas et al. 2001, 557). Second, lack of objectivity can 
expose the auditor to legal penalties as well as reputational losses. Third, if current audit 
guidance encourages auditors to engage in confirmation bias, it then becomes instructive 
for standard setters to know whether alternate wording can potentially mitigate this bias 
or alternatively exploit the bias in such a way as to increase professional skepticism 
(Nelson 2009). Lastly, given that FVEs vary in the degree of estimation uncertainty, and 
thereby risk of material misstatement, it is important to know how this uncertainty 
influences auditors’ propensities toward exhibiting confirmation bias under current and 
alternate audit guidance, in addition to its underlying effects on professional skepticism. 
Research investigating likely sources of auditor biases and errors when auditing 
fair value estimates is critical to maintaining the value and integrity of the audit. Of equal 
import is critical evaluation of the standards put forth by regulatory bodies to guide the 
auditor in evaluating the reasonableness of management’s FVEs. As noted previously, 
AU Sec. 332.35 states that the auditor should obtain evidence supporting management’s 
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assertions about the fair value of derivatives (AICPA 2000). Martin et al. (2006) warn 
that “auditors must be careful not to simply search for evidence that corroborates 
management’s estimates, even though current audit guidance specifies that very 
approach” (289). They suggest that corroborative evidence can be readily and rather 
easily attained if that is the only evidence pursued. Instead, Martin et al. (2006) suggest 
that auditors should also consider information that could potentially disconfirm 
management’s assertions. Performing a more balanced search for information requires 
individuals to exert more effort, making them more attentive to relevant cues and 
allowing them to process information more deeply (Kunda 1990). Thus, simple strategies 
such as reframing of the standards could be effective in reducing confirmation bias in 
auditors. Furthermore, focusing on disconfirming evidence could potentially serve to 
increase professional skepticism exercised in the evaluation of FVEs. 
While the study of confirmation bias has a sound foundation in psychology 
literature, it remains important to examine and understand the phenomenon in accounting 
settings. Kida (1984) notes that most of the work on confirmatory strategies in 
psychology focuses on the areas of person perception, social interaction, and 
stereotyping, with students used as the primary subjects.  It is questionable as to whether 
findings in psychology generalize to audit settings as the tasks required of audit 
professionals entail fundamentally different cognitive strategies in working problems 
related to their expertise (Joyce and Biddle 1981). The accounting setting differs from 
general settings not only with regard to levels of education and experience but also 
because accounting professionals are subject to regulatory constraints and are held 
accountable to multiple constituents. These circumstances would seemingly work to 
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discourage confirmation bias as accounting professionals would be motivated to be 
accurate in order to avoid professional and legal scrutiny from regulators and other 
stakeholders. Prior research, however, has demonstrated that confirmation bias does exist 
in a variety of accounting settings, particularly the tax setting (e.g., Cloyd & Spilker 
1999, 2000; Kadous et al. 2008). However, Kadous et al. (2008) note that prior findings 
related to confirmation bias in a tax setting do not generalize to all accounting situations. 
Specifically, the authors assert that the finding that confirmation bias in tax preparers is 
significantly reduced for high-risk clients demonstrates that confirmation bias previously 
observed in low-risk settings does not generalize to high-risk settings, where it would be 
of most concern. Fair value auditing could potentially be an area of high risk for auditors 
because of the uncertainty involved in both deriving and auditing fair value estimates. 
The mixed evidence noted in the tax literature, as well as fundamental differences 
between the tax and audit settings (discussed below), precludes drawing any conclusions 
relative to the audit environment. These factors provide motivation for investigating 
whether confirmation bias in auditors is affected by the extent of uncertainty (thereby, 
risk) inherent in management’s FVE. 
While the tax setting provides a rich environment for confirmation bias to arise, 
because of the client advocacy role that tax professionals assume when they are retained 
by the client it is not known whether findings from the tax literature will generalize to the 
audit setting. Like tax professionals, auditors must often search through a great deal of 
authoritative literature and evidence to determine an appropriate accounting treatment or 
reporting method. Like tax professionals, auditors also have a desire to please and retain 
clients, suggesting that they may likewise be susceptible to a confirmation bias during 
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their search for evidence. Unlike tax professionals, however, auditors do not act as client 
advocates. Rather, auditors are public stewards and must evaluate evidence objectively 
and with professional skepticism. Professional skepticism in an audit setting requires that 
the auditor not be satisfied with evidence which is less than persuasive simply by virtue 
of a belief that management is honest (AICPA 1997). This ascribes to the auditor a role 
much closer to that of a watchdog than to a client advocate. This watchdog role, 
combined with reputation and litigation risk concerns, should mitigate the potential for a 
confirmation bias. Given these competing incentives, it is important to investigate 
whether auditors succumb to a confirmation bias in their search for information and 
whether this bias influences their judgments (Kadous et al. 2008; Trotman 2005) and 
professional skepticism (Nelson 2009).  
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows:  Chapter 2 reviews 
prior literature and develops the research hypotheses. Chapter 3 discusses the research 
design and method, as well as results from the pilot study. Chapter 4 presents the results 
of the study, and Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation with a discussion of the results, 
contributions, limitations, and potential implications for practice and future research.  
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CHAPTER 2:  THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
2.1 Introduction  
Before discussing the theory and hypotheses, I provide background information 
on several important concepts used in my research study.  The literature review for this 
dissertation begins with a background of fair value reporting and describes the elements 
of fair value reporting that make it a topic of interest for academic research. This section 
focuses primarily on an important characteristic of fair value reporting, “uncertainty,” 
and describes how this notion of uncertainty relates to auditor judgment in the presence 
of current and alternate guidance. Psychology and accounting literature are reviewed to 
provide a background for the research questions. Specifically, the psychology literature 
describes a potential judgment bias which may arise during the audit of fair value 
measurements (i.e., confirmation bias), while the accounting literature describes various 
accounting settings in which confirmation bias has been investigated. A synthesis of 
these streams of literature provides the basis for the hypotheses proposed in this study.     
2.2 Background  
2.2.1 Fair Value Reporting    
There has been ongoing debate regarding whether financial reporting should 
move toward fair value reporting and away from historical cost reporting. While each of 
the methods has its merits and drawbacks, the past few decades have witnessed the 
development and implementation of standards which allow for increased reporting of 
assets and liabilities at their fair values (e.g. FAS 87 Employer’s Accounting for Pensions 
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(FASB 1985), FAS 133 Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities 
(FASB 1998) and FAS 143, Accounting for Asset Retirement Obligations (FASB 2001)). 
More recently, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued Financial 
Accounting Standard (FAS) 157, Fair Value Measurements, which provides overall 
guidance on fair value reporting.  
The need for FAS 157 arose from the various definitions of fair value as provided 
in other accounting pronouncements (e.g., FAS 13, Accounting for Leases and FAS 107 
Disclosure about Fair Value Instruments) as well as the limited measurement guidance 
provided in these pronouncements. The purpose of FAS 157, therefore, is to enhance 
consistency and comparability in fair value measurements across companies. FAS 157 
applies broadly to financial and nonfinancial assets and liabilities (e.g. derivative 
instruments), which are already covered by other authoritative accounting 
pronouncements. FAS 157 defines fair value and establishes a framework for measuring 
fair value, including a hierarchy of inputs and different valuation methods. 
Fair value is defined as “the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to 
transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the 
measurement date” (FAS 157, 6). Given that this definition assumes that the asset or 
liability is exchanged, the objective of a fair value measurement is to determine an exit 
price. The fair value measurement also assumes that the transaction to sell the asset or 
transfer the liability occurs in the principal market for the asset or liability or, in the 
absence of a principal market, the most advantageous market for the asset or liability 
(FAS 157, 7).  
 14 
The fair value hierarchy distinguishes between observable and unobservable 
inputs. Inputs are market assumptions about fair value rather than entity (i.e., 
management) assumptions. These assumptions include judgments related to risk that are 
used by market participants in pricing assets and liabilities. FAS 157 recommends that 
the valuation techniques used to measure fair value should maximize the use of 
observable inputs and minimize the use of unobservable inputs (FAS 157, 10). Thus, the 
fair value hierarchy gives the highest priority to quoted prices (unadjusted) in active 
markets for identical assets and liabilities (Level 1) and the lowest priority to 
unobservable inputs (Level 3) (FAS 157, 10).  
As a result, FAS 157 and the increasing use of fair value reporting is 
controversial.  Proponents of fair value reporting argue that (1) investors are concerned 
with value, not costs, (2) historical prices become irrelevant over time, (3) fair value 
reflects true economic substance, and (4) fair value represents an unbiased measurement 
that is consistent from period to period and across entities (Penman 2007; Barlev and 
Haddad 2003). Opponents, on the other hand, argue that fair values may be biased when 
(1) the firm arbitrages market prices, (2) fair values bring price bubbles into financial 
statements, (3) assets and liabilities are not matched, and (4) managers possess subjective 
biases (Penman 2007). Of particular interest to my study are the arguments made relative 
to bias in measurements.  I do not distinguish between honest biases (i.e., natural 
optimism) and dishonest biases (i.e., artificial inflation of asset values) of managers, since 
the role of the auditor is to attest to the fairness of the estimates regardless of the source 
of the bias. To date the academic research supports opponents’ arguments that fair value 
estimates are biased (e.g., Ramanna 2008; Mazza et al. 2008). In summary, the degree of 
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subjectivity involved in fair value estimation is greater for a Level 3 input versus a Level 
1 input, and the broad range of judgments involved in fair value estimation (e.g., 
identifying primary markets, input levels, valuation techniques, etc.) calls into question 
the reliability of management’s estimates and the importance of increased auditor 
scrutiny.  
2.2.2 Auditing fair values 
 The prospect for managers to act opportunistically emphasizes the need for 
auditors to evaluate the reasonableness of management’s estimates and assumptions. Of 
equal importance is critical evaluation of the standards put forth by regulatory bodies to 
guide the auditor in evaluating the reasonableness of management’s FVEs. Auditors have 
the role of collecting sufficient competent audit evidence to provide reasonable assurance 
that fair value measurements reported in the financial statements are in conformity with 
GAAP (AICPA 2002). Paralleling U.S. standards, ISA 540 states that the objective of 
auditing fair value estimates is to “obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence about 
whether: (a) accounting estimates, including fair value accounting estimates, in the 
financial statements, whether recognized or disclosed, are reasonable; and (b) related 
disclosures in the financial statements are adequate, in the context of the applicable 
financial reporting framework” (IAASB 2009, 5). Fair values present challenges for 
auditors because of the uncertainty involved in their estimations. Given the added risk 
associated with uncertainty, it is important for the auditor to understand the potential 
sources of uncertainty and management’s role in deriving the fair values. 
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2.2.2.1 Estimation Uncertainty 
 As noted above, fair value measurements involve varying degrees of subjectivity 
and some are inherently more complex than others. This complexity can arise for various 
reasons, including the nature of the item being measured and the valuation method used 
to determine the fair value. AU Section 328, Auditing Fair Value Measurements and 
Disclosures, characterizes complex fair value measurements as those that involve greater 
uncertainty regarding the reliability of the measurement process, and also lists factors 
which may result in greater uncertainty. These factors include the length of the forecast 
period, the number of significant and complex assumptions associated with the process, a 
higher degree of subjectivity associated with the assumptions and factors used in the 
process, a higher degree of uncertainty associated with the future occurrence or outcome 
of events underlying the assumptions used, and lack of objective data when highly 
subjective factors are used (AICPA 2002). Similarly, International Standard on Auditing 
(ISA) 540 acknowledges that the degree of estimation uncertainty varies based on the 
nature of the accounting estimate, the extent to which a generally accepted method is 
used to make the estimate, and the subjectivity of the assumptions used in making the 
estimate (IAASB 2009).  
The degree of estimation uncertainty associated with an accounting estimate may 
influence the estimate’s susceptibility to bias, thus affecting the risk of material 
misstatement. Similar to AU Section 328, ISA 540 indicates that the degree of estimation 
uncertainty may be influenced by factors including the extent to which the estimate 
depends on judgment, the sensitivity of the accounting estimate to changes in 
assumptions, the existence of recognized measurement techniques that may mitigate the 
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estimation uncertainty, the length of the forecast period and the relevance of the data 
drawn from past events to forecast future events, the availability of data from an external 
source, and the extent to which the estimate is based on observable versus unobservable 
data (IAASB 2009). ISA 540 provides examples of accounting estimates involving 
relatively low estimation uncertainty and presumably lower risk of material misstatement. 
These include estimates that (1) arise from non-complex business transactions, (2) are 
frequently made because they relate to routine transactions, (3) are derived from readily 
available (i.e., observable) market data, and (4) require a simple, well-known, or 
generally accepted method of measurement. Alternatively, accounting estimates 
involving relatively high estimation uncertainty may be characterized by more complex 
assumptions, are highly dependent upon judgment, are not calculated using recognized 
measurement techniques, and use highly specialized entity-developed models for which 
there are no observable inputs (IAASB 2009). 
As noted above, the subjectivity of management provided estimates increases 
with the extent of complexity (i.e., degree of estimation uncertainty). Similarly, the 
susceptibility of a fair value estimate to management bias increases with the degree of 
subjectivity involved in making it because of the unobservable (thus less verifiable) 
nature of the assumptions driving the estimation process (IAASB 2009).  
In general, research finds that reliability of estimates increases when they are 
derived from actively traded market information (i.e., Level 1 input) versus internally 
(management) generated information (i.e., Level 3 input) (Barth 1994; Petroni and 
Wahlen 1995). Mazza et al. (2006 working paper) investigates the potential for earnings 
management in a Level 3 input (an asset retirement obligation), and they find that when 
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faced with a dilemma of choosing between self-interest and company-interest, financial 
executives with a performance-based bonus plan choose an amount that serves their self-
interest. McEwen et al. (2008) find that financial analysts are aware of this potential for 
earnings management in Level 3 inputs. Specifically, they find that financial analysts 
expect firm managers to take advantage of the discretion allowed in determining the fair 
value of nonfinancial assets and liabilities (i.e., in Level 3 inputs). Interestingly, they find 
that analysts ignore management’s biases in measuring fair values when it furthers the 
analysts’ own self-interest related to stock price valuation assessments about the 
company. This suggests that even outside stakeholders take advantage of the innate 
subjectivity involved in the Level 3 inputs.  
It has also been proposed that analysts will have problems in carrying out a 
quality analysis of fair value estimates because of the difficulty in discovering estimation 
errors, regardless of whether they are random or biased (Penman 2007). Given the 
incentive for management to bias estimates and the difficulty (or disincentives) users may 
have in unraveling errors, the competence and independence of monitors (i.e., auditors) 
must be evaluated (Penman 2007).  
2.2.2.2 Audit guidance  
 AU Section 328 Auditing Fair Value Measurements and Disclosures (AICPA 
2002) provides broad guidance on auditing fair value estimates and their related 
disclosures in the financial statements. For example, AU Section 328 prescribes that the 
auditor should obtain an understanding of the entity’s process for determining fair value 
measurements (FVMs) and the relevant controls, assess the risk of material misstatement, 
evaluate whether the entity’s method for determining FVMs is consistent, and whether to 
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use the work of a specialist. This section, however, does not provide specific guidance for 
how to audit selected assets and liabilities. Instead, AU 328 directs auditors to other 
standards for more specific guidance. AU 332, for instance, provides guidance for 
auditing derivative instruments, hedging activities, and investments in securities. 
Specifically, this standard says that “the auditor should obtain evidence supporting 
management’s assertions about the fair value of derivatives and securities measured or 
disclosed at fair value” (AU Sec. 332.35, AICPA 2000). This standard provides auditors 
with a directional goal versus a non-directional goal. That is, the standard directs auditors 
to find evidence to support management’s goals rather than to obtain objective evidence 
in order to assess the reasonableness of management’s FVM. Martin et al. (2006) suggest 
that the wording of this standard can actually lead to a confirmation bias, wherein the 
auditor searches for information that supports management’s estimates and either 
disregards or diminishes the weight given to disconfirming information.  
AU Section 328 also suggests that the auditor may make an independent estimate 
of fair value to corroborate management’s fair value estimate. When doing so, the auditor 
may use a self-developed model and may evaluate management’s assumptions or develop 
his or her own assumptions. In either case, the auditor should understand management’s 
assumptions and use that understanding to ensure that their own independent estimate 
takes into account all significant variables related to the estimate. This understanding will 
also assist in evaluating any significant differences from management’s estimate. 
ISA 540 advises the auditor to consider developing a point estimate or a range to 
evaluate management’s estimate. This approach may be most appropriate when (1) an 
estimate is not derived from the routine processing of data by the accounting system, (2) 
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the auditor’s review of similar estimates made in the prior period financial statements 
suggests that management’s current period process is unlikely to be effective, (3) the 
entity’s controls within and over management’s processes for determining estimates are 
not well designed or properly implemented, (4) events or transactions between the period 
end and the date of the auditor’s report contradict management’s point estimate, and (5) 
there are alternative sources of relevant data available (IAASB 2009). 
Alternatively, the auditor can search for information which disconfirms 
management’s estimates. Currently, there are no audit standards which specifically direct 
the auditor to “disconfirm” management’s assertions, however, fraud standards (e.g., 
SAS 99) are nuanced such that the auditor should not be satisfied with client-provided 
evidence on the belief that management is honest. SAS 99, Consideration of Fraud in a 
Financial Statement Audit (AICPA 2002), requires the auditor to exercise professional 
skepticism regardless of the auditor’s belief about management’s honesty and integrity, 
and “requires an ongoing questioning of whether the information and evidence obtained 
suggests that a material misstatement due to fraud has occurred” (AU 316.13).  This 
wording implies that standard setters may consider a “questioning” or “disconfirming” 
approach to be a reasonable approach in areas that involve greater judgment and 
incentive for management bias, as is the case with fair value estimation because of the 
uncertainty involved and the higher risk of material misstatement. A disconfirming 
approach would serve to heighten the auditor’s professional skepticism, thereby 
enhancing the likelihood that biased estimates are detected. Some may argue that a 
disconfirming approach would lead to an inefficient audit in cases where management’s 
estimate is unbiased; however, the objective of this dissertation is not to determine the 
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appropriate balance between audit efficiency and effectiveness. Rather, the goal, as it 
relates to professional skepticism, is to determine whether audit guidance can be used to 
heighten auditors’ professional skepticism.   
2.2.2.3 Professional Skepticism 
Nelson (2009) defines professional skepticism as “indicated by auditor judgments 
and decisions that reflect a heightened assessment of the risk that an assertion is 
incorrect, conditional on the information available to the auditor” (1). Relative to other 
definitions provided in prior research and audit standards (e.g., SAS No. 1),3
Nelson (2009) provides a model that describes how audit evidence combines with 
auditor knowledge, traits, and incentives to produce judgments and actions that reflect 
professional skepticism. (See Figure 1.) Of primary interest to my study is whether audit 
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definition takes more of a “presumptive doubt” than a “neutral” view of professional 
skepticism, suggesting that auditors who exhibit high professional skepticism need 
relatively more persuasive evidence (in terms of quality and/or quantity) to be convinced 
that an assertion is correct (Nelson 2009, 1). This definition is consistent with the 
wording found in fraud standards, as well as other areas where management has greater 
discretion (e.g., accounting estimates) (Nelson 2009). For example, SAS No. 57 states 
that accounting estimates are based on subjective, as well as objective factors, and given 
the potential for bias in the subjective factors auditors should consider both subjective 
and objective factors with an attitude of professional skepticism. Consistent with Nelson 
(2009), I adopt the “presumptive doubt” definition of professional skepticism to evaluate 
the extent to which auditors exercise professional skepticism in evaluating FVEs. 
                                                 
3 SAS No. 1 indicates that professional skepticism is “an attitude that includes a questioning mind and a 
critical assessment of audit evidence.” AU 230.07-09 states that the auditor “neither assumes that 
management is dishonest nor assumes unquestioned honesty.” (AICPA 1997) 
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guidance and uncertainty affect professional skepticism through their effect on auditors’ 
confirmation bias during the evidential input phase.4
                                                 
4 Nelson (2009) defines evidential input as “any information collected and considered in the course of the 
audit” (6). 
 (See Figure 2). Using Nelson’s 
(2009) professional skepticism model as a foundation, I seek to explain how and why the 
predicted effects occur.    
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situations involving uncertainty. The theory of motivated reasoning (Kunda 1990) 
provides insight into individuals’ search strategies and their propensity to exhibit 
confirmation bias. Framing induced biases, such as negativity bias, help to explain 
differences in behaviors when individuals review positive and negative information. In 
this section, these theories are reviewed and examined in accounting settings to form the 
basis for the study’s hypotheses. 
2.3.1 Motivated Reasoning 
Kunda (1990) proposed the theory of motivated reasoning, wherein motivation 
affects reasoning through reliance on a biased set of cognitive processes: strategies for 
accessing, constructing, and evaluating beliefs. Kunda defines motivation as “any wish, 
desire, or preference that concerns the outcome of a given reasoning task” (p. 480). The 
basic premise of the theory is that when people are motivated to either be accurate or 
consistent with a desired conclusion, they tend to use more cognitive effort and attend to 
more relevant information that supports their goal.   
 Kunda’s review of motivated reasoning is divided into two categories: (1) 
accuracy goals that lead to the use of beliefs and strategies that are considered most 
appropriate, and (2) directional goals that lead to the use of beliefs and strategies that are 
considered most likely to yield the desired conclusion.5
 According to Kunda, the work on accuracy-driven reasoning suggests that when 
people are motivated to be accurate, they will exert more effort, pay attention to relevant 
 Kunda notes that while the two 
types of goals are both indicative of motivated reasoning, they should be considered 
separately as they may involve different mechanisms.  
                                                 
5 In this study, I use the term “non-directional” goal instead of “accuracy” goal to avoid the implication that 
auditors are not concerned with accuracy when engaging in directional goals. 
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cues, and process information more deeply. In fact, several different kinds of biases have 
been shown in psychology research to be lessened in the presence of accuracy goals. 
Kunda surmises that people that are motivated to be accurate will likely seek and use 
rules and beliefs for processing information that is deemed more appropriate. 
 In the second area, relating to directional goals, Kunda proposes that people 
motivated to arrive at a particular conclusion attempt to be rational and to construct a 
justification of their desired conclusion that would persuade an unbiased observer. In 
order to achieve this, people maintain an “illusion of objectivity,” searching memory for 
specific beliefs and rules that support their desired position. They may also use their 
knowledge to construct theories that could logically support their desired conclusion.  
 Boiney et al. (1997) propose and demonstrate two extensions to the motivation 
literature. First, they find that motivated reasoning is instrumental, meaning that 
motivated individuals bias their judgments more or less as needed to support the desired 
conclusion, subject to reasonable constraints.6
 Kunda and Sinclair (1999) also extend the motivated reasoning research by 
arguing that, in addition to the activation of helpful knowledge, individuals also inhibit 
thoughts that would disconfirm their desired conclusion. In other words, motivation may 
 In other words, despite the motivation to 
reach a desired conclusion, individuals make decisions they are able to justify. Thus, 
auditors may not engage in motivated reasoning to the extent that they would like 
because they may be constrained by litigation concerns. Second, Boiney et al. (1997) find 
that motivated individuals exhibit confidence bolstering, meaning that they will adjust 
their confidence in their motivated judgments.  
                                                 
6 Reasonable constraints for auditors may include standards, regulations, and generally accepted accounting 
principles. 
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activate (suppress) the knowledge structures that would support (interfere with) reaching 
the desired outcome. Kunda and Sinclair suggest that it is difficult for individuals to 
maintain a belief when there is information that contradicts it, thus they believe that 
individuals suppress such contradictory information when accessing and weighing cues. 
Thus, a confirmation bias can be introduced as early as in the information search stage.  
2.3.2 Confirmation Bias   
Confirmation bias, a specific form of motivated reasoning, has been defined in a 
variety of ways in the psychology literature. Klayman and Ha (1987) suggest that people 
who are prone to a confirmation bias tend to test those cases that have the best chance of 
verifying current beliefs (positive testing) rather than those that have the best chance of 
falsifying them (negative testing). They suggest people use the positive test strategy as a 
general default heuristic and that positive testing often serves the hypothesis tester well. 
Klayman and Ha concede, however, that positive testing can lead to problems when 
applied inappropriately. For example, it can produce misleading feedback by failing to 
reveal falsifications or it can lead to inefficiency or inaccuracy by overweighting and 
underweighting data. They conclude that the consequences of using a positive test 
strategy vary with the characteristics of the task, thus making generalizations from prior 
research difficult.  
Jonas et al. (2001) use the term “confirmation bias” to mean something slightly 
different from Klayman and Ha (1987). Jonas et al. (2001) suggest that the positive test 
strategy to which Klayman and Ha refer means asking questions that are consistent with 
the hypothesis being tested. Jonas et al. (2001) argue that gathering evidence to support 
the hypothesis should be labeled ‘positive hypothesis testing’ rather than ‘confirmation 
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bias’ because this way of asking questions does not imply that the person will be 
confirmed in his or her hypothesis. Thus, Jonas et al. (2001) define confirmation bias to 
mean “requesting information that supports a pre-selected alternative, thus the decision 
maker using this strategy knows that he or she will get the confirmation sought” (557). 
Consistent with prior literature (e.g. Kadous et al. 2008), this paper adopts the definition 
provided by Jonas et al. (2001); that is, a confirmation bias will be said to exist when 
auditors search for and consider information that supports a pre-selected alternative. In 
this study, because of the first-mover effect, wherein management provides the auditor 
with its FVE, the pre-selected alternative (by default) is the client’s reported FVE; thus a 
confirmation bias will be documented when the auditor searches for and emphasizes 
evidence which favors management’s FVE over evidence which disfavors management’s 
FVE. I argue, however, that the pre-selected alternative can be changed by simply 
reframing the audit guidance. Specifically, when the audit guidance tells the auditor to 
find evidence opposing management’s fair value estimates, then the pre-selected 
alternative shifts from evidence that corroborates management’s FVE to evidence that 
questions management’s FVE. In this case, a confirmation bias is said to exist when the 
auditor searches for and emphasizes evidence which disfavors management’s FVE over 
evidence which favors management’s FVE. For expositional purposes, and consistent 
with McMillan and White (1993), this confirmatory strategy that is biased in the direction 
of disfavoring evidence will be referred to as a “conservative bias.” In either case 
(confirmation bias vs. conservative bias), bias is defined as a deviation from a balanced 
search.   
  29 
2.3.2.1 Confirmation Bias in Auditing   
 Prior literature demonstrates that accounting professionals exhibit confirmation 
bias when reviewing client-provided information. The tax literature, for example, finds 
strong evidence that tax professionals engage in motivated reasoning and exhibit 
confirmation bias when the client’s preferred position is known. These results may differ 
for auditors because, unlike the client advocacy role assumed by tax professionals, 
auditors are called to be objective and exercise professional skepticism throughout the 
audit (AICPA 1997). Like tax professionals, however, auditors often face incentives (e.g., 
competitive market pressures) to acquiesce to client preferred positions, and may engage 
in motivated reasoning at the expense of professional skepticism. For example, Salterio 
and Koonce (1997) find that when client preference is known and the available evidence 
regarding appropriate treatment is mixed, auditors tend to follow the client’s position. 
Other studies, however, show that auditors are sensitive to disconfirming evidence (e.g., 
Ashton and Ashton 1988, 1990; Tubbs et al. 1990), and that this could be due to 
professional skepticism or natural constraints at work in the profession (Ashton and 
Ashton 1990; Asare and Wright 2003). 
 A substantial body of research in auditing examines whether auditors exhibit 
confirmation bias when gathering information that serves as evidence to support or refute 
initially-generated hypotheses. While many audit tasks, such as fair value evaluation, do 
not require initial generation of hypotheses, they require processing that is akin to 
hypothesis evaluation (Bonner 2008). For example, auditors assessing the reasonableness 
of a fair value estimate may not make a priori judgments about the fairness of the 
estimate before collecting evidence. According to Bonner (2008), their evaluation of 
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evidence, however, is similar to the process of evaluating an explicit hypothesis, and the 
choice available for assessments of fair value such as “reasonable” or “not reasonable” 
may be considered implicit hypotheses. Studies examining whether auditors exhibit 
confirmation bias when evaluating an initially-generated hypothesis find that 
confirmation bias is influenced by the source of the hypothesis. Specifically, when 
auditors develop their own hypothesis, they are more likely to search for confirming 
evidence which supports that hypothesis (Kaplan and Reckers 1989; Church 1990; 
Heiman-Hoffman et al. 1995; Bonner 2008). Further, McMillan and White (1993) 
investigate whether auditors’ evidence search is influenced by the frame of the initial 
hypothesis being tested. They find that when auditors favor an error frame (i.e., 
intentional or unintentional misstatements of financial statements), they react more 
strongly to both confirming and disconfirming evidence than those who favor a non-error 
frame (i.e., environmental or industry changes). They also find greater professional 
skepticism for auditors who favor the error frame, and conclude that confirmation bias 
may partially account for this effect by enhancing the emphasis on error.  
Decision strategies may differ, however, when auditors inherit a hypothesis from 
an external source. In auditing, it is often the case that auditors inherit hypotheses from 
their clients because of the “first mover/second mover” effect discussed previously. 
Earley et al. (2008) suggest that auditors’ judgments are influenced by information 
provided by the client, which may impede an auditor’s ability to make objective 
judgments. This information may be provided in the form of a client explanation or 
simply client-reported values. For example, Kinney and Uecker (1982) and McDaniel 
and Kinney (1995) find that auditors are influenced by client-provided book values to an 
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extent that the values bias the auditors’ expectations of the audited values, often leading 
to the incorrect acceptance of misstated accounts. My study extends these findings by 
examining whether directional audit guidance affects this previously documented 
confirmation bias. 
The extent to which auditors’ judgments are influenced by external sources (such 
as audit standards) depends both upon the credibility of the source and the extent to 
which the auditor is held accountable to the source (Bonner 2008). Given that auditors 
are held accountable to professional regulators, Kadous et al. (2003) investigate the 
extent to which audit regulation can help to reduce auditor biases. Their study finds that 
regulation requiring auditors to perform a quality assessment actually amplifies the 
effects of motivated reasoning on acceptance of clients’ aggressive reporting methods. 
Thus, it is conceivable that audit regulation contributes to auditors’ confirmatory 
tendencies when the guidance increases the salience of a desired conclusion. My study 
analyzes the effects of both directional and non-directional audit guidance on auditors’ 
search strategies to determine whether directional audit guidance results in a greater 
extent of confirmation (conservative) bias exhibited by auditors in the evaluation of 
FVEs. 
Koehler (1991) argues that decision makers who are asked to explain or imagine 
that a hypothesis is true will temporarily accept the hypothesis as true, consequently 
affecting their information search and interpretation of relevant data. In other words, 
Koehler suggests that a task requiring that a hypothesis be treated as if it were true is 
sufficient to increase confidence in the truth of that hypothesis, at the expense of viable 
alternatives. Thus, I propose that directional audit guidance can affect auditor 
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confirmation bias by providing the auditor with an implicit hypothesis that implies either 
veracity (e.g., confirm) or doubt (e.g., disconfirm).    
Non-directional audit guidance (e.g., generate own estimate) may serve to curb 
confirmation bias by emphasizing accuracy over efficiency. For example, Brown et al. 
(1999) find that auditors exhibit less confirmation bias when interpreting audit evidence 
when they are told to emphasize truth discovery over efficiency. Truth discovery is aimed 
at discovering the true cause of observed phenomena, while efficiency is aimed at 
lowering costs. Brown et al. (1999) employed a rule discovery game to test their 
hypotheses. The goal of the game was to identify the rule that generated a set of three 
integers between 1 and 100. They find that auditors become more confirmation prone 
with efficiency-oriented incentives than with truth-oriented incentives. They also find 
that when incentives reward effectiveness, auditors are disconfirmation prone. Following 
Kunda (1990), I expect a non-directional goal (e.g., generate own) to elicit truth/accuracy 
discovery strategies, and directional goals (e.g., confirm/disconfirm) to lead to biased 
search strategies, biased in the direction of the goal. In addition, the magnitude of bias 
may be influenced by the extent to which the auditor searches for negative (disfavoring) 
evidence relative to positive (favoring) evidence. For example, Levin et al. (1998) review 
different types of framing effects and make note of negativity bias, wherein people pay 
greater attention to and are influenced more by negative information relative to positive 
information. 
2.3.3 Negativity bias 
 Rozin and Royzman (2001) indicate that, “…in most situations, negative events 
are more salient, potent, dominant in combination, and generally efficacious than positive 
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events” (297). Rozin and Royzman suggest that there is no single theory to explain this 
negativity bias and instead propose four contributors to negativity bias: negative potency, 
greater steepness of negative gradients, negativity dominance, and negative 
differentiation. Each of these is briefly defined below.  
The first contributor, negative potency refers to the greater strength and higher 
salience of negative information versus positive information, given positive and negative 
information of equal objective magnitude. The second contributor is greater steepness of 
negative gradients, wherein negative events “grow more rapidly in negativity as they are 
approached in space or time than do positive events” (Rozin and Royzman 2001, 298). 
Rozin and Royzman note, however, that this greater steepness of negative gradients could 
simply be a manifestation of negative potency as additional negative units will produce 
larger psychological effects than additional positive units. 
 The third contributor of negativity bias is negativity dominance in which, “the 
holistic perception and appraisal of integrated negative and positive events (or objects, 
individuals, hedonic episodes, personality traits, etc.) is more negative than the algebraic 
sum of the subjective values of those individual entities” (Rozin and Royzman 2001, 
299). Rozin and Royzman suggest that negativity dominance occurs after the possibility 
of negative potency and is therefore independent of it. 
 Finally, the fourth contributor to negativity bias is referred to as greater negative 
differentiation. Rozin and Royzman state that “negativity bias manifests itself in the fact 
that negative stimuli are generally construed as more elaborate and differentiated than the 
corresponding positive stimuli” (299). For example, Rozin and Royzman note that the 
vocabulary to describe negative events is far richer and more varied than the vocabulary 
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used to describe positive events, and that there are a greater number of negative emotions 
than positive emotions. 
My study does not attempt to differentiate between the four types of negativity 
bias as each points to the same implication, namely that auditors will demonstrate a 
stronger reaction to negative (i.e., disfavoring) evidence than positive (i.e., favoring) 
evidence. In summary, I propose that audit guidance for evaluating FVEs provides an 
implicit hypothesis to the auditor and that the hypothesis frame (i.e., support or 
disconfirm) affects the auditor’s propensity to exhibit confirmation bias or conservative 
bias depending upon the direction of the guidance. Specifically, I predict that when audit 
guidance directs the auditor to support management’s FVE, the guidance provides an 
implicit hypothesis that the estimate is accurate and, consistent with motivated reasoning, 
auditors will exhibit a confirmation bias, wherein they favor supporting evidence over 
disconfirming evidence. Alternatively, when audit guidance directs the auditor to 
disconfirm management’s FVE, the guidance provides an implicit hypothesis that the 
estimate may be doubtful and auditors will exhibit a conservative bias, wherein they 
favor disconfirming evidence over confirming evidence. Further, due to the influence of 
negativity bias, I expect that the magnitude of bias in the disconfirm condition will be 
greater than the magnitude of bias in the confirm condition. In the absence of directional 
guidance (e.g., the auditor is directed to generate his or her own estimate), the auditor 
does not inherit an implicit hypothesis and it is not clear whether the auditor will adopt a 
confirmatory approach biased towards supporting evidence or a conservative approach 
biased towards disconfirming evidence. In either case, I expect any confirmation bias or 
conservative bias exhibited under non-directional guidance to be less pronounced than 
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bias exhibited when auditors are provided with directional audit guidance. I also expect 
that the extent of confirmation bias or conservative bias will depend upon the degree of 
uncertainty inherent in the FVE as discussed in the next section.  
2.3.4 Estimation Uncertainty 
 Fair value estimation is an ambiguous task given that fair value estimation 
requires a great number of cues to be taken into account and these cues can be complex, 
contradictory, and uncertain (Budner 1962, 30). Norton (1975) provides eight conditions 
that would classify information as ambiguous, and one of those conditions is uncertainty 
(608). Thus, as the degree of uncertainty (i.e., lack of precision in measurement) 
increases, the fair value estimation becomes more ambiguous, and the evaluation 
becomes more complex for auditors. Prior literature has suggested that intolerance for 
ambiguity affects auditors’ judgments and decisions (e.g., Faircloth and Ricchiute 1981; 
Nelson and Kinney 1997). Budner (1962) defines intolerance for ambiguity as “the 
tendency to perceive (i.e., interpret) ambiguous situations as a source of threat” (29). 
Dermer (1973) suggests that individuals deal with this threat by searching for more 
information in an effort to become more confident in decisions. Thus, it is reasonable to 
expect that auditors will exhibit a greater magnitude of confirmation bias under 
conditions of high uncertainty relative to low uncertainty as auditors will seek more 
information that supports their desired conclusion. It is also possible that auditors will 
deal with ambiguity by escaping into whatever seems concrete (Frenkel-Brunswik 1948, 
115, c.f., Norton 1975), or qualitative (Dermer 1973). In my study, the audit guidance is 
concrete and qualitative; thus, auditors may rely only on audit guidance to drive their 
search, regardless of the uncertainty surrounding the FVE. It is possible, therefore, that 
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uncertainty will have no effect on the extent of auditors’ confirmation bias. Bonner 
(2008) also suggests that as task complexity increases, auditors may experience cognitive 
overload and may switch from compensatory to noncompensatory processing. In 
compensatory processing, cues can compensate for each other (Bonner 2008). In other 
words, individuals make trade-offs between conflicting information. In noncompensatory 
processing, individuals do not allow cues to compensate for each other, thereby avoiding 
conflict (Bonner 2008). Thus, it is possible that auditors, in an effort to avoid conflict, 
will not seek additional information when faced with a FVE involving high uncertainty 
and will resort to the same degree of confirmation bias exhibited by auditors evaluating a 
FVE involving low uncertainty.  
 Of interest to this study is whether high uncertainty leads to greater bias. Further, 
I investigate whether there is an interactive effect between audit guidance and uncertainty 
such that the magnitude of conservative bias exhibited by auditors instructed to oppose 
management’s FVE is greater than the magnitude of confirmation bias exhibited by 
auditors instructed to support management’s FVE when the FVE involves high 
uncertainty. In the next section, prior literature related to uncertainty in the audit setting is 
reviewed to provide further insight into auditors’ judgments and decisions in situations of 
uncertainty.  
2.3.4.1 Uncertainty in Auditing 
 Auditors are often faced with countervailing incentives that can affect the extent 
of confirmation bias and professional skepticism exercised in situations involving 
uncertainty. For example, auditors may be influenced by the long-term goal of attracting 
and retaining clients, leading to auditor support of management’s aggressive reporting 
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choices (Kadous et al. 2008). Alternatively, auditors may react conservatively to 
uncertainty to avoid legal and reputational losses. 
 Prior research has demonstrated that accounting professionals use ambiguity 
(including the uncertainty in both financial reporting guidance and in reporting outcomes) 
to support desired goals and conclusions. For example, archival analysis of auditor 
judgments finds that auditors are less likely to require adjustments when the reporting in 
question involves subjective accounting rules and judgments (Nelson et al. 2002, 2003). 
Nelson (2002) finds that auditors are less likely to question earnings management under 
vague standards compared to more precise standards. Behavioral studies find similar 
results (e.g., Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996; Mayhew et al. 2001; Kadous et al. 2003). 
Mayhew et al. (2001), for example, find that uncertainty about the appropriate accounting 
treatment influences auditor objectivity such that auditors misreport in favor of their 
client. Hackenbrack and Nelson (1996) also find that, given sufficient ambiguity, auditors 
justify aggressive reporting through their own aggressive interpretations of accounting 
standards.7
Wright and Wright (1997) examine various factors affecting the decision to waive 
audit adjustments and find that auditors are more likely to waive subjective adjustments 
(e.g., accounting estimates) than objective adjustments. They suggest that the decision to 
waive a subjective adjustment can be more easily justified, such as in the event of 
litigation.  
 Nelson (2003) adds that, even with precise standards, incentive-consistent 
reporting choices are often justified through aggressive interpretation of evidence. 
                                                 
7 In their experiment, the appropriate reporting method involved uncertainty in that it depended on whether 
the amount could be “reasonably estimated.” 
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Alternatively, uncertainty in accounting practices or accounting outcomes may 
lead auditors to make more conservative decisions to avoid legal and reputational losses. 
Nelson and Kinney (1997) find that auditors exhibit a conservative bias towards 
uncertainty about the probability that a future loss will occur (i.e., loss contingency 
reporting judgments). Interestingly, despite the finding that auditors are more 
conservative when evaluating probability of future loss, Nelson and Kinney find that 
auditors are less conservative than financial statement users. The authors conjecture that 
the finding may be related to auditor concern about jeopardizing client relations by 
unnecessarily reporting on contingent losses. Despite this evidence of a conservative 
reaction to ambiguity, prior research supports the notion that auditors will use latitude in 
standards and estimates to justify their desired goals. 
Overall, the studies reviewed are consistent with motivated reasoning in that 
auditors use latitude in standards and estimates to justify their desired goals. In this study, 
the desired goal is determined by the audit guidance. While prior research shows that 
other factors, such as client retention, accountability, and litigation risk, influence 
confirmation bias in auditors, I hold these factors constant so that any differences 
detected between conditions can be attributed to the variables of interest (i.e., audit 
guidance and uncertainty).  
2.4 Hypotheses 
The main purposes of this paper are to examine whether directional audit 
standards and uncertainty affect confirmation bias in auditors and the extent to which this 
bias increases or decreases professional skepticism when evaluating fair value estimates. 
The next sections present the study’s formal hypotheses.  
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2.4.1 Auditor Bias and Uncertainty Hypotheses 
Motivated reasoning theory proposes that when individuals have directional goals, 
they engage in biased reasoning to achieve those goals (Kunda 1990). Consistent with 
this theory, audit research reports that auditors exhibit bias when they have preferred 
goals and that they exploit uncertainty in the decision context to achieve those goals. 
Further, ambiguity intolerance theory suggests that individuals who are intolerant of 
uncertainty can deal with the threat of uncertainty by searching for more information and 
this extended search can increase bias. Collectively, these theories and prior audit 
literature suggest that directional audit guidance and estimation uncertainty individually 
and jointly affect auditor bias in the evaluation of fair value estimates. While audit 
literature also identifies factors that can work to mitigate auditor bias (e.g., conservatism, 
litigation concerns), it is not known how these factors will influence auditor behaviors in 
a fair value setting. Thus, my predictions are grounded in psychology theories. 
Specifically, I propose that when auditors are given directional guidance they will exhibit 
bias when auditing client-reported values and that this bias will be magnified when 
uncertainty surrounding management fair value estimates is increased. (See Figure 3 for a 
graphical depiction of the predicted interaction effect.) Formally stated: 
H1a:  When uncertainty associated with a fair value estimate goes from a low 
level to a high level the provision of directional guidance relative to non-
directional guidance will increase the bias in the auditor evaluation of 
management’s estimate. 
 
Evidence from psychology literature also demonstrates that negative information 
influences individuals’ evaluations more strongly than positive information.  Thus, I 
predict that when auditors are specifically directed to disconfirm, they will exhibit greater 
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bias due to the influence of negativity bias and that this bias8
H1b:  The combination of disconfirm directional audit guidance and high 
uncertainty in management’s fair value estimate will result in the greatest 
bias in auditor evaluation of fair value estimates.  
 will become greatest when 
estimation uncertainty is high. Formally stated: 
 
Figure 3: Interaction Effect Predicted in Hypothesis 1a 
 
support generate own oppose
low uncertainty
high uncertainty
 
 
 
Given the potential implications of directional audit guidance and uncertainty for 
practice and standard-setting, it is important to examine the individual main effects of 
each on confirmation bias. For example, it could be informative to standard-setters to 
understand the effects of directional audit guidance on confirmation bias, irrespective of 
the level of uncertainty, as they consider issuing audit guidance in other areas such as the 
evaluation of Management’s Discussion and Analysis. It could also be informative to 
                                                 
8 Recall that bias represents a deviation from a balanced search. In the discussion of the results, an auditor 
who seeks more confirming evidence than disconfirming evidence will be said to exhibit a confirmation 
bias, while an auditor who seeks more disconfirming evidence than confirming evidence will be said to 
exhibit a conservative bias. 
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firms who issue additional guidance to auditors via practice guides and other materials 
such as decision aids. Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis in an effort to assess 
the effect of audit guidance on bias. 
H1c:  Auditors presented with directional audit guidance will exhibit a 
 greater magnitude of bias during the evidential input phase relative to 
 auditors presented with non-directional audit guidance.  
 
The simple main effects of uncertainty can also be of interest to practitioners as 
uncertainty will most certainly have implications for audit efficiency and effectiveness, 
irrespective of the audit guidance issued. Auditors’ inexperience with, and intolerance 
for, uncertainty could lead to biased evaluations of fair value estimates. As noted 
previously it is expected that auditors examining fair value estimates under high 
uncertainty will seek more information to deal with the threat of uncertainty, and the 
nature of the information (i.e., positive versus negative) will affect the extent of 
confirmation bias. Thus, I hypothesize that high uncertainty in fair value estimates will 
lead auditors to exhibit a greater magnitude of bias than low uncertainty. Formally stated:  
H1d:  Auditors evaluating a fair value estimate involving high estimation 
 uncertainty will exhibit a greater magnitude of bias during the evidential 
 input phase relative to auditors evaluating a fair value estimate involving low 
 estimation uncertainty.   
 
2.4.2 Professional Skepticism Hypotheses 
To evaluate the effect of confirmatory strategies in evidential input on 
professional skepticism, I examine whether auditors who exhibit confirmation 
(conservative) bias during the evidential input phase also exhibit less (more) professional 
skepticism in their subsequent judgments and decisions. Consistent with Nelson’s (2009) 
professional skepticism model, I separate professional skepticism into two components: 
skeptical judgment and skeptical action. Judgment is a critical part of the audit and is 
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required in the evaluation of audit evidence (AICPA 1997). In general, one would expect 
judgments to influence decisions. However, it is possible that skeptical judgments formed 
during evidence evaluation do not translate into skeptical actions. Nelson (2009) argues 
that auditors must exceed a certain threshold of skeptical judgment to create skeptical 
action. In addition, Nelson proposes that the extent to which skeptical judgment affects 
skeptical action may depend on auditors’ incentives and traits. Thus, it is important to 
examine whether skeptical judgments formed in the evaluation of fair value estimates 
lead to skeptical actions.  
Nelson’s model shows that evidence evaluation is an important input of skeptical 
judgment and that skeptical judgment is a primary driver of skeptical action. Consistent 
with Nelson’s model, I expect that when an auditor exhibits bias in evidence evaluation, 
this bias will affect the auditor’s skeptical judgment, and this judgment will subsequently 
affect the auditor’s skeptical action. Specifically, I predict that when auditors exhibit 
confirmation (conservative) bias during the evidential input phase, this bias affects their 
subsequent skeptical judgment. This hypothesis is nondirectional since confirmation bias 
and conservative bias go in opposite directions. Further, I predict that as skeptical 
judgment increases so will skeptical action. Formally stated: 
H2:  Auditors’ bias significantly affects auditors’ skeptical judgment.   
 
H3:  Increasing skeptical judgment will result in increasing skeptical action.   
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CHAPTER 3:  METHOD 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 I employ an experiment to investigate whether audit guidance and estimation 
uncertainty independently and jointly affect auditors’ confirmation bias and professional 
skepticism in the evaluation of FVEs. The experimental design allows for the 
investigation of auditors’ search processes, as well as resulting judgments and decisions. 
An important aspect of this study is that it uses a custom web-based instrument, which 
allows me to track auditors’ search patterns and time spent viewing evidence. This aspect 
will provide insight into how auditors make decisions and whether processes employed 
and effort exercised during the evidential input phase affect auditors’ resulting judgments 
and decisions. 
3.2 Research Design   
To address the research questions, I use a 3 x 2 between-participants experimental 
design in which professional auditors and undergraduate auditing students were recruited 
to participate. The first independent variable is audit guidance and the second 
independent variable is uncertainty. The experimental design and manipulations are 
depicted in Table 1. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the six conditions 
shown in Table 1.
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Table 1: 3 x 2 Factorial Research Design 
 Factor 1: Audit Guidance 
Support 
Estimate 
Generate 
Own 
Estimate 
Disconfirm 
Estimate 
 
Factor 2: Estimation 
Uncertainty 
Low 
 
   
High 
 
   
 
Factor 1: Audit guidance 
Level 1: Support Management’s Estimate – auditors are provided with audit 
guidance telling them to support management’s fair value estimate. 
Level 2: Generate Own Estimate – auditors are provided with audit guidance 
telling them to generate their own fair value estimate. 
Level 3: Disconfirm Management’s Estimate – auditors are provided with audit 
guidance telling them to oppose management’s fair value estimate. 
Factor 2: Estimation uncertainty 
Level 1: Low Estimation Uncertainty – the fair value estimate provided by 
management has little sensitivity to changes in assumptions made in deriving the 
estimate. 
Level 2: High Estimation Uncertainty – the fair value estimate provided by 
management is highly sensitive to changes in assumptions made in deriving the 
estimate. 
  
 
3.3 Treatments/Independent Variables 
3.3.1 Audit Guidance 
The first independent variable is “Audit Guidance” and it is manipulated at three 
levels: (1) support management’s estimate, (2) disconfirm management’s estimate, and 
(3) generate own estimate. Wording for the support management’s estimate manipulation 
is as follows: 
Support management’s estimate: 
When reviewing management’s key assumptions, and evidence related to these 
assumptions, assume that the following audit standards and firm policies are in 
place. 
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Auditing standards and your firm’s policies require, among other things, that the 
auditor: 
  
obtain evidence supporting management’s assertions about the fair 
value of the reacquired franchise rights,  
 
and that the auditor shall: 
 
evaluate available evidential matter so as to corroborate the fair value 
amount of the reacquired franchise rights.  
 
  The wording for the support condition is taken directly from AU Sec. 332.35 
(AICPA 2000). The rationale for confirmatory guidance relates to audit efficiency. That 
is, if management’s estimates are reasonable, then confirming these estimates rather than 
investigating possible alternatives leads to a more efficient audit. Bonner (2008) notes 
that confirmation bias may be an adaptive mechanism that works well in many cases. 
Hence, it may be the case that confirmation bias would work well if management’s 
estimates were unbiased; however, the motivation for this study is predicated on research 
that shows that management’s estimates may be biased.9
 Wording for the disconfirm management’s estimate manipulation is as follows: 
  
Disconfirm management’s estimate: 
When reviewing management’s key assumptions, and evidence related to these 
assumptions, assume that the following audit standards and firm policies are in 
place. 
 
Auditing standards and your firm’s policies require, among other things, that the 
auditor: 
  
obtain evidence opposing management’s assertions about the fair 
value of the reacquired franchise rights,  
 
                                                 
9 This research does not discriminate between honest bias (i.e., natural optimism) and dishonest bias (i.e., 
opportunistic reporting). 
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and that the auditor shall: 
 
evaluate available evidential matter so as to question the fair value 
amount of the reacquired franchise rights.  
    
 The wording of this condition is intended to represent the opposite frame of the 
wording presented in AU Sec. 332.35 (AICPA 2000). The word “opposing” is used 
instead of “disconfirm” because feedback from academics revealed that the word 
“disconfirm” carried too strong of an implication that the auditor should not be satisfied 
with management’s fair value estimate unless it could be proven to be incorrect. The 
intention of the disconfirm condition is to induce the auditor to view information which 
disfavors management’s estimate, however, the intention is not to rule out the possibility 
that management’s estimate is reasonable. In other words, the intention is to reduce 
auditor overreliance on (or overconfidence in) client representations. The term 
“opposing” presumes doubt in the representational faithfulness of the estimate and should 
lead the auditor to question management’s estimate. One could argue that this approach 
may lead to an inefficient audit in cases where management’s estimate is not biased; 
however, the research objective of this project is not to find the optimal level of 
efficiency in auditing FVEs. Rather, the objective is to determine whether the framing of 
the guidance will increase or decrease confirmation bias in auditors when evaluating fair 
value estimates. 
 Finally, the wording for the generate own estimate manipulation is as follows: 
Generate own estimate: 
When reviewing management’s key assumptions, and evidence related to these 
assumptions, assume that the following audit standards and firm policies are in 
place. 
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Auditing standards and your firm’s policies require, among other things, that the 
auditor: 
  
 obtain evidence to develop an independent estimate using 
 management’s assumptions about the fair value of the reacquired 
 franchise rights,  
 
and that the auditor shall: 
 
 evaluate available evidential matter so as to separately derive the fair 
 value amount of the reacquired franchise rights. 
 
  The wording for this condition is derived from AU 342 Auditing Accounting 
Estimates (AICPA 1988) and ISA 540, Auditing Accounting Estimates, Including Fair 
Value Estimates, and Related Disclosures (IAASB 2009), which both encourage (but do 
not require) the auditor to develop an independent expectation of the estimate to 
corroborate the reasonableness of management’s estimate. According to Martin et al. 
(2006), “auditors are likely to benefit from producing independent estimates …rather 
than merely assessing the reasonableness of management’s estimates” (298). This is 
likely because simply requiring auditors to either confirm or contradict management’s 
FVEs may lead the auditor to disregard evidence that provides additional information 
about the estimate, simply because it neither confirms nor contradicts management’s 
FVEs. In other words, providing specific instructions for confirming or disconfirming 
management’s FVEs can encourage a myopic view of relevant information. Motivated 
reasoning theory (Kunda 1990) supports the notion that developing an independent 
estimate (i.e., a non-directional goal) encourages a more balanced search for information 
(thus, less bias), relative to a directional goal requiring the auditor to either support or 
oppose management’s FVE. 
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3.3.2 Estimation Uncertainty  
The second independent variable is “estimation uncertainty,” manipulated at two 
levels: low and high, whereby estimation uncertainty is defined as the susceptibility of an 
accounting estimate and related disclosures to an inherent lack of precision in its 
measurement (IAASB 2009, 5). As indicated in Section 2.2.2.1, degree of estimation 
uncertainty may be influenced by factors including the extent to which the estimate 
depends on judgment, the sensitivity of the accounting estimate to changes in 
assumptions, the existence of recognized measurement techniques that may mitigate the 
estimation uncertainty, the length of the forecast period and the relevance of the data 
drawn from past events to forecast future events, the availability of data from an external 
source, and the extent to which the estimate is based on observable versus unobservable 
data (IAASB 2009). In my study, I manipulate uncertainty by varying both the extent to 
which the estimate depends on judgment, as well as the sensitivity of the accounting 
estimate to changes in assumptions. I chose to manipulate uncertainty using two aspects 
of uncertainty to increase the salience of the manipulation. With respect to the first aspect 
(the extent to which the estimate depends on judgment), I simply tell the participant that 
“…management’s estimate involves low (high) uncertainty as the estimate has little 
(high) sensitivity to changes in management’s assumptions.” I also italicized and changed 
the font color of the key words to blue in order to direct the participants’ attention to the 
features of low and high uncertainty. With regard to the second aspect (sensitivity of 
estimate to changes in management’s assumptions), I tell participants that a member of 
the audit team prepared a sensitivity analysis which further develops management’s 
consideration of alternative assumptions or outcomes, and develops a range for 
  49 
evaluating management’s point estimate. The range provided for the low uncertainty 
condition was adapted from the Kohlbeck et al. (2009) task and was set as $18,229,000 to 
$23,353,500, indicating a spread of $5,124,500. This spread was doubled in the high 
uncertainty condition, leading to a range of $15,666,750 to $25,915,750. These ranges 
were pilot-tested using 41 Audit I students to ensure that the manipulation of the range 
for low versus high uncertainty was effective. Students were presented with a book value, 
a fair value, and the range developed in the sensitivity analysis, and were asked to rate the 
extent of uncertainty associated with the range using a scale of zero to nine, where zero = 
no uncertainty and nine = maximum uncertainty. The mean rating of uncertainty in the 
low condition was 2.71 (21 participants), and the mean rating of uncertainty in the high 
condition was 5.05 (20 participants). A t-test revealed that this difference was statistically 
significant (F = 19.953, p=.000), thus the manipulation of the range was deemed to be 
effective. The specific wording for both aspects of the low and high uncertainty 
manipulations are as follows: 
Low uncertainty: 
Your task is to evaluate management’s fair value estimate by reviewing 
management’s assumptions and evidence available to management when 
determining the fair value estimate.  
 
 A sensitivity analysis prepared by a member of the audit team shows that 
management’s estimate involves low uncertainty as the estimate has little 
sensitivity to changes in management’s assumptions. The sensitivity analysis 
further develops management’s consideration of alternative assumptions or 
outcomes, and develops a range to evaluate management’s point estimate. 
 
The range developed in sensitivity analysis is $18,229,000 to $23,353,500. 
This range can be accessed throughout your review of management’s assumptions 
and evidence by returning to the tab marked “Review Audit Task.” 
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High uncertainty: 
Your task is to evaluate management’s fair value estimate by reviewing 
management’s assumptions and evidence available to management when 
determining the fair value estimate.  
 
 A sensitivity analysis prepared by a member of the audit team shows that 
management’s estimate involves high uncertainty as the estimate has high 
sensitivity to changes in management’s assumptions. The sensitivity analysis 
further develops management’s consideration of alternative assumptions or 
outcomes, and develops a range to evaluate management’s point estimate. 
 
The range developed in sensitivity analysis is $15,666,750 to $25,915,750. 
This range can be accessed throughout your review of management’s assumptions 
and evidence by returning to the tab marked “Review Audit Task.” 
 
3.4 Dependent Variables 
3.4.1 Dependent Variables for Confirmation Bias 
 Three dependent variables are used to measure confirmation bias and to test 
hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d, which predict the interaction and main effects of Audit 
Guidance and Estimation Uncertainty.  
 The first dependent variable (TIMESTD) is based on the amount of time spent 
viewing evidence during the evidential input phase. Following Kadous et al. (2008) this 
variable represents the amount of time spent viewing confirming evidence minus the 
amount of time spent viewing disconfirming evidence, divided by the total time spent 
viewing all evidence. A positive number suggests a relative emphasis on confirming 
evidence (i.e., confirmation bias); whereas, a negative number suggests a relative 
emphasis on disconfirming evidence (i.e., conservative bias). 
 A second dependent variable (VIEWSTD) is computed by taking the number of 
views of confirming evidence less the number of views of disconfirming evidence, 
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divided by the total number of views. A positive number indicates a confirmation bias 
and a negative number indicates a conservative bias. 
 A third dependent variable (SAVED) is computed by using the types of evidence 
saved to the work paper file. This is a count variable where number of confirming pieces 
of evidence and number of disconfirming pieces are counted and compared between 
groups.   
3.4.2 Dependent Variables for Professional Skepticism 
 Two dependent variables are used to measure professional skepticism: skeptical 
judgment and skeptical action.  
 Skeptical judgment is measured as the risk that management’s fair value estimate 
is materially misstated, where 1 is minimum risk and 9 is maximum risk. This dependent 
variable is used to test hypothesis 2, which predicts that auditor bias affects skeptical 
judgment. 
 Skeptical action is measured using the auditor’s recommended dollar amount 
adjustment to the client’s reported book value of the intangible asset. A downward 
adjustment will be representative of skeptical action. This dependent variable is used to 
test hypothesis 3, which predicts that greater skeptical judgment leads to greater skeptical 
action.   
3.5 Covariates 
 Various questions were included in the instrument to control for factors that may 
influence confirmation bias, such as knowledge and experience. I also included factors 
identified in Nelson’s (2009) professional skepticism model as determinants of skeptical 
judgment and skeptical action. Specifically, I collected information regarding 
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participants’ general propensity to be skeptical using the Hurtt (2007) scale, and 
information regarding their ambiguity intolerance using Budner’s (1962) scale. I also 
asked participants to self-report their knowledge of fair value and auditing work 
experience (related to both general audit work and auditing fair values). 
3.5.1 Knowledge of Fair Value 
Auditors may have difficulty assessing the reasonableness of management’s 
estimates if they lack the knowledge to do so. The absence of requisite knowledge for 
assessing the reasonableness of fair value estimates may contribute to a confirmation bias 
as the auditor would simply rely on management’s estimate rather than conducting an 
appropriate evaluation of the evidence. Bedard and Mock (1992) compare search 
strategies of computer audit specialists and non-specialists in a control evaluation task. 
They find that specialists searched faster, for less information, and in a more directed 
manner. Participants were asked to report on a nine-point scale how knowledgeable they 
are of fair value accounting, where 1 = not at all knowledgeable, and 9 = extremely 
knowledgeable.    
3.5.2 Experience  
Jones and Sugden (2001) suggest that confirmation bias may be robust to 
experience. Auditing studies examining the role of experience in confirmation bias find 
mixed results. Church (1990) suggests that inexperienced auditors are more likely to 
exhibit confirmation bias than experienced auditors. Kaplan and Reckers (1989) find that 
experienced auditors do not succumb to a confirmation bias while performing an 
analytical review task, while inexperienced auditors do. However, Bamber et al. (1997) 
report that both experienced and inexperienced auditors show evidence of confirmation 
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bias in fraud likelihood tasks. Participants were asked to self report the number of times 
that they have reviewed fair value estimates in practice, as well as how long they have 
been employed as an auditor. Participants were also asked to report their rank at the audit 
firm (e.g., staff, senior, manager, partner, or other).  
Nelson’s (2009) professional skepticism model also shows that experience and 
knowledge may positively or negatively affect the level of professional skepticism 
exercised by auditors. Shaub and Lawrence (2002), for example, show that less 
experienced auditors are more aggressive skeptics than experienced auditors. Nelson 
(2009) suggests that auditor knowledge of errors and error patterns can serve to enhance 
professional skepticism; however, if auditors learn to assume non-error explanations over 
time, then greater frequency knowledge can actually undermine professional skepticism. 
Thus, knowledge and experience are controlled when examining both confirmation bias 
and professional skepticism. 
3.5.3 Auditor Traits  
Nelson’s (2009) model also shows that auditor traits can affect the amount of 
professional skepticism in audit decisions and judgments. Two traits of interest to this 
study are professional skepticism and ambiguity intolerance. While professional 
skepticism is identified as a dependent variable in this study, it is important to note that 
the dependent variables for professional skepticism (e.g., skeptical judgment and 
skeptical action) are measuring cognitive responses to the manipulated variables. The 
covariate measure of professional skepticism will assess auditors’ innate professional 
skepticism (i.e., professional skepticism trait). Hurtt (2007) provides a 30-item scale to 
measure professional skepticism. This scale is based on six characteristics of skeptics that 
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are distinct from knowledge and ethics: (1) suspension of judgment, (2) questioning 
mind, (3) search for knowledge, (4) interpersonal understanding, (5) self-confidence, and 
(6) self-determination. A copy of the scale, along with instructions, is presented in 
Appendix A.   
 Intolerance of ambiguity has been identified as a personality trait which deserves 
more attention in the accounting literature (Faircloth and Ricchiute 1981; Gul 1986). Gul 
(1986) suggests that there is a relationship between individuals’ intolerance of ambiguity 
and confidence in their decisions. Dermer (1973) argues that people who are intolerant of 
ambiguity are less confident in their judgments and decisions than people who are 
tolerant of ambiguity. Dermer further suggests that persons who are ambiguity intolerant 
will seek to reduce the threat of ambiguity by searching for more information. Thus, 
auditors’ intolerance for ambiguity trait is measured and controlled using Budner’s 
(1962) scale. This scale is a validated scale which has been used in prior accounting 
research (e.g., Dermer 1973). A reliability analysis performed by Furnham (1994) shows 
that the scale has a reliability score of 0.59. While Furnham reports that other scales have 
higher reliability scores, Budner’s scale was selected because of brevity and general 
acceptance. Budner’s scale is “one of the best known, and well used scales in this area…” 
(Furnham 1994, 404). A copy of Budner’s scale, along with scoring guidelines, is 
presented in Appendix B.    
3.5.4 Confidence 
As discussed previously, Koehler (1991) suggests that when people need to 
explain a hypothesis, they temporarily assume that the hypothesis is true. Additionally, 
Koehler asserts that any task requiring that a hypothesis be treated as if it were true is 
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sufficient to increase confidence in that very hypothesis. Koehler explains that the 
increased confidence comes at the expense of other plausible alternatives because of 
changes in problem representation, evidence evaluation, and information search that take 
place when the hypothesis is temporarily treated as if it were true. Boiney et al. (1997) 
also suggest that it is possible that motivated individuals make themselves confident 
through an internal rationalization process employed in order to reach the desired 
conclusion despite the weak evidence to support it. Thus when the standard wording 
suggests that the auditor should confirm that management’s estimate is true, it will 
change the problem representation to one where the auditor experiences an increase in 
confidence in that estimate and the auditor may fail to conduct a balanced review of the 
evidence. Participants were asked to report on a nine-point scale how confident they feel 
about their assessment of management’s fair value estimate, where 1 = not at all 
confident and 9 = extremely confident.  
3.5.5 Risk Perceptions 
 Bamber et al. (1997) propose that auditors’ sensitivity to risk may affect their 
attitude to evidence. They find that auditors’ attitudes toward evidence are sensitive to 
audit risk, specifically, the risk of material misstatement. I use two questions to capture 
auditors’ risk perceptions. First, participants are asked to report on a nine-point scale their 
assessment regarding the likelihood that the PCAOB would scrutinize the client’s fair 
value estimate, where 1 = PCAOB would not scrutinize and 9 = PCAOB would definitely 
scrutinize. Second, participants are asked to report on a nine-point scale how risky their 
client is (compared to the population of all possible clients), where, 1 = minimum risk 
and 9 = maximum risk.  
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3.5.6 Accountability 
 Prior research demonstrates that accountability may influence the judgments of 
auditors (e.g., Kennedy 1993). Hoffman and Patton (1997) find that auditors tend to shift 
their judgments towards what they foresee will be defensible to their superiors, resulting 
in more conservative fraud risk judgments. This suggests that auditors respond to 
anticipated scrutiny with conservatism. Thus, as estimation uncertainty increases, 
auditors may generate conservative estimates as a means of protecting themselves from 
scrutiny. To control for accountability effects, I include two questions aimed at capturing 
participants’ perceptions of accountability. The first question asks auditors to report how 
motivated they were to give answers which they could justify. This question is measured 
using a nine-point scale where 1 = not at all motivated and 9 = extremely motivated. The 
second question asks auditor to report the likelihood that someone (e.g., a supervisor) 
would contact them regarding their recommendations related to the client’s fair value 
estimate. This question is measured using a nine-point scale where 1 = someone would 
definitely not contact me and 9 = someone would definitely contact me.  
3.5.7 Goal Commitment 
 Prior literature has found that goal commitment can influence the effect of 
directional goals on auditors’ reporting decisions. For example, Church (1991) finds that 
level of commitment to their hypotheses affected auditors’ overall evaluations of mixed 
evidence. Specifically, Church finds that auditors with high commitment to their 
hypotheses attached more importance to confirming evidence than those who where not 
strongly committed. Interestingly, Church does not find differences of importance among 
auditors in regard to disconfirming evidence. Kadous et al. (2003) also find that auditors 
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are more likely to identify the client’s method as the most appropriate method when they 
are more committed to their directional goals. Thus, it is possible that goal commitment 
will differentially affect the importance that auditors give to confirming and 
disconfirming evidence. Consistent with Kadous et al. (2003), I use a 5-question measure 
of goal commitment. This 5-question scale was originally developed by Klein et al. 
(2001). The goal commitment measures are shown below in Table 2.  
Table 2: Goal Commitment Measures 
 completely 
disagree 
disagree 
somewhat 
neutral agree 
somewhat 
completely 
agree 
1) I thought this was 
a good goal to shoot 
for. 
     
2) I was strongly 
committed to 
pursuing this goal. 
     
3) It was hard to take 
this goal seriously.* 
     
4) Quite frankly, I 
didn’t care if I 
achieved this goal or 
not.* 
     
5) It wouldn’t have 
taken much to make 
me abandon this 
goal.* 
     
The five items above were applied to one of the following three goals which matched 
the experimental condition to which participants were assigned. 
Goal: Find support for management’s assertions about the fair value estimate. 
(Support condition) 
Goal: Find reasons for why management’s assertions about the fair value estimate 
might not be reasonable. (Disconfirm condition) 
Goal: Identify the estimate that would be most appropriate in the eyes of external 
users. (Generate own condition) 
 
* Items 3, 4, and 5 were reverse-scored. 
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3.6 Task 
 The case, adapted from Kohlbeck et al. (2009), involves a fair value estimation 
task where participants were required to review a potential impairment of an intangible 
asset (reacquired franchise rights). This case was selected for several reasons. First, the 
fair value estimation in the case relies heavily on management’s assumptions, thus 
allowing for the manipulation of estimation uncertainty by varying the extent of 
sensitivity of the FVE to changes in management’s assumptions. Second, the case was 
originally derived and adapted from an actual transaction recorded by Krispy Kreme 
Doughnuts, Inc., adding realism to the case. Third, interviews with partners/shareholders 
from a Big Four firm and a large regional firm revealed that evaluations of fair value 
estimates for intangible assets is common for auditors, thus enhancing the generalizability 
of the results.   
The case involved reviewing assumptions made by management in deriving its 
fair value estimate for reacquired franchise rights. The case materials consisted of the 
following items: (1) company background and financial information, (2) the audit task, 
and (3) the evidence available to management for making its assumptions and deriving 
the FVE. The company background and financial information described the client’s 
business (including franchising activities), and presented selected account balances and 
disclosures before audit adjustments. The audit task described the audit firm’s 
relationship with the client and informed participants of the audit guidance relevant to the 
audit of the FVE. This section also detailed the participant’s assignment which included 
instructions to: (1) evaluate management’s key assumptions by searching for and 
reviewing evidence which favors and disfavors management’s estimate, and (2) save the 
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evidence items which they would cite in a memo to be retained in the working papers as 
evidence that they have complied with the audit standard.  
The case materials included management’s reported book value, the estimated fair 
value, a summary of the four assumptions made by management in estimating the FVE, 
and evidence either favoring or disfavoring management’s FVE. The evidence was 
organized by assumption with six pieces of evidence for each assumption. Three pieces 
of evidence favored management’s estimate while the other three pieces disfavored 
management’s estimate. The organization of the evidence was randomized to control for 
order effects.  
Participants were given ten minutes to search through the evidence and to save the 
pieces they wished to include in the work paper file. The purpose of the time limit was to 
simulate time pressures faced by auditors on audit engagements. Pilot testing with Ph.D. 
students revealed that 10 minutes allowed sufficient time for participants to review 
evidence, but not so much time that they could view all of the available evidence. Upon 
completion of search, participants reported (1) the perceived risk of material 
misstatement related to management’s FVE, and (2) a recommended adjustment (if any) 
to management’s FVE.  Participants then completed a post-experimental questionnaire 
that included manipulation checks and demographic questions. 
3.7 Participants 
Professional auditors were recruited to participate in the study. Interviews with 
partners from a Big 4 firm and a large regional firm indicated that all levels of auditors 
(including staff auditors) should have sufficient fair value auditing knowledge to perform 
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the task. In addition, undergraduate auditing students participated in both the pilot study 
and the main study.  
3.8 Pilot Study 
A pilot study was conducted using undergraduate accounting students enrolled in 
an Audit I course. The primary purpose of the pilot study was to ensure that the 
manipulations had their intended effects. Despite evidence that the manipulation check 
questions may not have been clear to participants, data from the pilot study revealed 
support for the hypothesized effects of audit guidance and estimation uncertainty on 
extent of agreement with management’s estimate. A secondary purpose of the pilot study 
was to be sure that the experimental materials were complete and understandable prior to 
computerization. The pilot study also provided information for setting time limits for the 
evidence evaluation phase. Due to the purposes of the pilot study and the limited 
participant pool, only two forms of guidance were tested in the pilot study: support 
management’s estimate and generate own estimate. Several modifications to the 
experimental case were made and incorporated into the final computerized version. These 
modifications are discussed in Section 3.8.7.     
3.8.1 Research Design (Pilot Study) 
 The pilot study employed a 2 x 2 factorial design with two forms of audit 
guidance (support management’s estimate and generate own estimate) and two levels of 
estimation uncertainty (low and high). Participants were randomly assigned to one of four 
treatment conditions and completed a paper-based version of the task described in 
Section 3.6.  
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3.8.2 Treatments/Independent Variables (Pilot Study) 
The first independent variable, audit guidance, was varied as either directional or 
non-directional as follows: 
Directional guidance – “The audit standard related to the audit of intangible 
assets directs you to obtain evidence supporting management’s assertions about 
the fair value of the reacquired franchise rights.”  
 
Non-directional guidance – “The audit standard related to the audit of intangible 
assets directs you to obtain your own reasonable range of outcomes with which to 
evaluate management’s assertions about the fair value of the reacquired franchise 
rights.” 
 
 The second independent variable, estimation uncertainty, is varied at two levels, 
low and high. For the pilot study, uncertainty was manipulated by explicitly telling 
participants that the fair value estimate involves low (high) uncertainty because 
management’s assumptions are based on data from external (internal) sources, depend on 
little (much) judgment, and has little (high) sensitivity to changes in assumptions. 
Further, the evidence items provided in the case materials were manipulated to reflect the 
respective level of uncertainty. 
3.8.3 Dependent Variables (Pilot Study) 
 Two measures of confirmation bias were developed for the pilot study. The first 
measure of confirmation bias was the extent to which participants agree with 
management’s fair value estimate (AGREE). This measure ranges from 1 = “strongly 
disagree” to 8 = “strongly agree.” A higher number represents a greater extent of 
confirmation bias. A second measure of confirmation bias was constructed to assess 
confirmation bias during information search (SEARCH). This dependent variable is 
measured as the total amount of confirming evidence viewed minus the total amount of 
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disconfirming evidence viewed, divided by total evidence viewed. A larger and more 
positive percentage represents a greater extent of confirmation bias.   
3.8.4 Manipulation Checks (Pilot Study) 
 To assess whether participants understood the audit guidance, participants were 
asked whether the audit guidance they received told them to support management’s 
estimate, disconfirm management’s estimate, or neither support nor disconfirm 
management’s estimate. Only 38 percent of participants responded correctly to this 
manipulation check question. While this may suggest that participants did not attend to or 
understand the audit guidance manipulation, results show that there were differences 
between these groups and the differences were in the predicted direction. Results from 
debriefing with participants suggest that the manipulation check question was unclear. 
This question was revised in the instrument to say, “The relevant audit guidance (i.e., 
audit standards and your firm’s policies) for the evaluation of fair value estimates 
requires you to obtain evidence: (1) supporting management’s assertion, (2) opposing 
management’s assertions, or (3) developing your own independent estimate.” 
 To assess whether participants attended to the uncertainty manipulation, 
participants were asked whether management’s FVE for reacquired franchise rights 
involved low or high uncertainty. Only 75 percent of participants passed this 
manipulation check. As a result, this manipulation was made more salient in the web-
based instrument developed for the experiment by (1) explicitly telling participants that 
the FVE involves low or high estimation uncertainty, and (2) providing sensitivity 
analysis which develops a range to be used in evaluating management’s point estimate. 
The purpose of the range is to highlight the sensitivity of the estimate to changes in 
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management’s assumptions. The broader the range, the more sensitive the estimate is to 
changes in management’s assumptions.   
3.8.5 Participants (Pilot Study) 
 Participants for the pilot study were 45 undergraduate accounting students 
enrolled in an Audit I course at a large university.10
3.8.6 Results (Pilot Study) 
 These students were selected for the 
pilot study because of their knowledge of fair value estimation (covered in an 
Intermediate I course), and their knowledge of audit requirements (covered in the first 
half of the Audit I course). Self-reports indicate that, on average, the students had eight 
years of general work experience, however, only one participant had worked in auditing. 
Further, only one participant had experience auditing fair value estimates. Eighty-nine 
percent of students had taken a course that covered fair value accounting.   
3.8.6.1 Descriptive Statistics (Pilot Study) 
 Table 3 provides descriptive statistics, by treatment condition, of the types of 
evidence participants viewed and saved during the evidence evaluation phase. 
Participants in the Support/Low Uncertainty condition viewed an average of 8.4 favoring 
items and 7.3 disfavoring items, while participants in the Support/High Uncertainty 
condition viewed an average of 9.6 favoring items and 6.5 disfavoring items. Participants 
in the Generate Own/Low Uncertainty condition viewed an average of 9.8 favoring items 
and 7.8 disfavoring items, and participants in the Generate Own/High Uncertainty 
condition viewed an average of 8.8 favoring items and 7.6 disfavoring items. In total, 
participants could view up to 24 evidence items; thus, results suggest that participants did 
                                                 
10 Eighty-four students participated over a total of three sessions; however, 39 students (Session 1) were 
dropped from the analysis because of the time-limit issue discussed in the previous section. 
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not view all available items. Given the limitations of a paper-based instrument, it is not 
clear whether participants ended the search voluntarily or at expiration of the time-limit. 
Based on the researcher’s observation, it is most likely that participants ended their 
search when they were instructed to do so at the end of seven minutes. 
Table 3: Mean Values (Standard Deviations) of Information Searched and Saved in 
the Work paper File 
 Support/ 
Low 
Uncertainty 
Support/ 
High 
Uncertainty 
Generate 
Own/ 
Low 
Uncertainty 
Generate Own/ 
High 
Uncertainty 
 Ca Db C D C D C D 
Average 
Number of 
Evidence 
Items 
Viewed 
(SEARCH) 
 
8.37 
n=11 
(1.81) 
 
7.27 
n=11 
(1.00) 
 
9.64 
n=11 
(2.01) 
 
6.45 
n=11 
(3.11) 
 
9.82 
n=11 
(2.09) 
 
7.82 
n=11 
(4.29) 
 
8.83 
n=12 
(1.59) 
 
7.58 
n=12 
(2.19) 
 
Average 
Number of 
Evidence 
Items Saved 
to Work 
Paper File 
(SAVE) 
 
 
4.18 
n=11 
(2.18) 
 
 
3.45 
n=11 
(1.97) 
 
 
3.82 
n=11 
(2.40) 
 
 
3.36 
n=11 
(2.62) 
 
 
 
5.27 
n=11 
(2.94) 
 
 
5.09 
n=11 
(3.53) 
 
 
 
4.67 
n=12 
(2.19) 
 
 
4.67 
n=12 
(2.02) 
aC=Confirming Evidence 
bD=Disconfirming Evidence 
 
 Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the two dependent variables, AGREE 
and SEARCH. Recall that AGREE measures confirmation bias by the extent to which 
participants agree with management’s estimate and a higher value indicates greater 
confirmation bias. SEARCH is a standardized measure of search emphasis on favoring 
versus disfavoring evidence.  
Figure 2 – Extended model for study 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables (AGREE) and (SEARCH) 
 Support/ 
Low Uncertainty 
Support/ 
High 
Uncertainty 
Generate Own/ 
Low 
Uncertainty 
Generate Own/ 
High 
Uncertainty 
AGREEa     
Mean 4.091 5.182 3.818 3.833 
Std. Dev. (1.375) (1.079) (0.874) (1.467) 
SEARCHb     
Mean 0.063 0.228 0.187 0.085 
Std. Dev. (0.148) (0.213) (0.361) (0.163) 
aAGREE = The extent to which participants agree with management’s fair value estimate 
(1=strongly disagree,8=strongly agree) 
bSEARCH = Standardized measure of search emphasis on confirming versus 
disconfirming evidence (Confirming Evidence-Disconfirming Evidence)/Total Evidence 
Viewed 
 
3.8.6.2 Test of Hypotheses (Pilot Study) 
 I test my hypotheses using Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) as shown in Table 5. 
Table 6 summarizes the relationships tested in the pilot study. Given that the primary 
purpose of the pilot study was to test the salience of the manipulations and the 
understandability of the task, the pilot materials did not include questions related to all of 
the covariates identified for the study. As a result, covariates are not included in the 
analyses described below.  
Table 5: The Overall Effect of Audit Guidance and Estimation Uncertainty on 
Extent of Agreement with Management’s Fair Value Estimate (AGREE) and 
Information Search (SEARCH) 
Panel A – Analysis of Variance – Effect of Audit Guidance and Estimation 
Uncertainty on AGREE 
Source df SS F p 
Corrected Model 3 4.643 3.078 .038 
Audit Guidance 1 7.382 4.893 .033 
Estimation Uncertainty 1 3.436 2.278 .139 
Audit Guidance*Estimation 
Uncertainty 
1 3.250 2.155 .150 
Error 41 61.848   
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Table 5: The Overall Effect of Audit Guidance and Estimation Uncertainty on 
Extent of Agreement with Management’s Fair Value Estimate (AGREE) and 
Information Search (SEARCH) (continued) 
Panel B – Analysis of Variance – Effect of Audit Guidance and Estimation 
Uncertainty on SEARCH 
Source df SS F p 
Corrected Model 3 .071 1.274 .296 
Audit Guidance 1 .001 .018 .895 
Estimation Uncertainty 1 .011 .202 .656 
Audit Guidance*Estimation 
Uncertainty 
1 .201 3.627 .064 
Error 41 2.276   
 
Table 6: Tests of Expected Relationships 
  Audit Guidance  
  Directionally-
Driven (Support) 
Accuracy-Driven 
(Generate Own) 
 
                
Uncertainty 
Low 
Uncertainty 
                              
A 
                              
B 
                  
AB 
 High 
Uncertainty 
                                     
C 
                          
D 
                  
CD 
  AC BD  
 
AC>BD Main effect of Audit 
Guidance on Extent of 
Agreement 
ANOVA – main effect 
test 
Supported  
(F = 4.893, p = 
.033) 
AC>BD Main effect of Audit 
Guidance on Information 
Search 
ANOVA – main effect 
test 
Not Supported 
Model not 
Significant 
measured 
variable 
Main effect of search 
strategy on Extent of 
Agreement 
ANOVA – main effect 
test 
Not Supported 
Model not 
Significant 
CD>AB Main effect of 
Uncertainty on Extent of 
Agreement 
ANOVA – main effect 
test 
Not Supported  
(F = 2.278, p = 
.139) 
C>A, B, 
D 
Moderating effect of 
Uncertainty on Main 
Effect of Audit Guidance 
ANOVA – interaction 
test 
Planned Comparisons (t-
tests) 
Not Supported 
Model not 
Significant 
 
 First, I discuss the results of a 2 x 2 ANOVA testing the effects of audit guidance 
and estimation uncertainty on extent of agreement with management’s estimate (Table 5, 
Panel A). The pilot study investigated whether auditors presented with directional 
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guidance to support management’s estimate will agree with management’s estimate to a 
greater extent than auditors presented with non-directional guidance to generate their own 
estimate. This test result (F = 4.893, p = 0.033) indicates that auditors exhibit 
confirmation bias to a greater extent when they are told to support management’s 
estimate (mean = 4.64) compared to when they are told to generate their own estimate 
(mean = 3.83). 
 I also investigated whether auditors evaluating a fair value estimate involving 
high uncertainty will agree with the estimate to a greater extent than auditors evaluating a 
fair value estimate involving low uncertainty. While the mean values are in the direction 
expected, test results are not significant at conventional levels (F = 2.278, p = 0.139).  
 An interaction effect between guidance and estimation uncertainty on extent of 
agreement with management’s estimate was tested. The interaction term is not significant 
at conventional levels (F = 2.155, p = 0.150).  
The remaining tests relate to the effects of audit guidance and estimation 
uncertainty on information search, as well as the effect of information search on extent of 
agreement with management’s estimate. Specifically, I test whether auditors presented 
with directional guidance to support management’s estimate will focus their search on 
confirming evidence versus disconfirming evidence to a greater extent than auditors 
presented with non-directional guidance to generate their own estimate. In the first 
remaining test I investigate whether auditors whose information search emphasizes 
confirming evidence will agree with management’s estimate to a greater extent than 
auditors whose information search emphasizes disconfirming evidence. In addition, I 
examine the possibility of an interaction effect between audit guidance and uncertainty on 
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information search. None of these tests were conclusive as the overall models were not 
statistically significant. I conducted a power analysis for each of the tested relationships 
and found that the observed power was too low to detect an effect. This may be due to 
small sample sizes (i.e., 11-12 participants per treatment cell) or lack of requisite 
knowledge by participants completing the task. Despite the low power, I conducted 
additional analyses to determine whether the means were in the predicted directions. 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for information searched and information saved 
in the work paper file. These statistics show that on average, all conditions viewed more 
confirming than disconfirming evidence.  
 The 2 x 2 ANOVA results presented in Table 5 Panel B show that the model was 
not statistically significant (F = 1.274, p = 0.296) so my subsequent interpretation of the 
results should be considered inconclusive. The interaction term had a marginally 
significant p-value (F = 3.627, p = 0.064) and it is possible that this effect would be 
observed with increased power. To further examine the potential of an interaction effect, 
I analyzed post hoc comparisons between the cell means and found that participants 
instructed to support management’s estimate in the high uncertainty condition 
emphasized confirming evidence over disconfirming evidence to a greater extent than all 
other conditions (p = 0.108).  
3.9 Implications of the Pilot Study  
Overall, the pilot study finds that participants receiving directional audit guidance 
telling them to support management’s FVE tended to agree more with management’s 
estimate than did participants receiving non-directional audit guidance telling them to 
generate their own estimate. Estimation uncertainty, however, had no effect on auditors’ 
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extent of agreement with management’s estimate. These results, however, should be 
interpreted with caution as many of the models tested were not statistically significant.  
Given the limited scope and purpose of the pilot study, the results are subject to 
other limitations. First, evidence, including interviews with student participants, revealed 
that the manipulations and manipulation check questions were not clear to participants. 
Several changes were made to the instrument and the post-experimental questionnaire to 
improve the salience of the manipulations and to clarify the manipulation check 
questions. Second, the pilot study utilized a paper-based instrument which limited the 
ability to investigate participants’ search processes. A customized web-based instrument 
was developed for the full experiment which allowed for the collection of richer data 
regarding participants’ search strategies. The web-based instrument was pilot tested by 
five Ph.D. students and two faculty members prior to making it available to study 
participants. Last, the web-based instrument was expanded to include measures of the 
covariates identified in Section 3.5.  
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
4.1 Introduction 
 This chapter presents the results of the tests of hypotheses. Details regarding the 
data collection and sample selection process are provided first, followed by a discussion 
of the participant demographics and manipulation checks. The tests of the study’s 
hypotheses are described next. The chapter concludes with a discussion of alternative 
tests performed to test the robustness of the findings. 
4.2 Background and Descriptive Statistics 
 I collected data over a two-month period using a customized web-based survey 
instrument. Participants included 30 professional auditors and 101 auditing students. The 
professional auditors were recruited via an e-mail sent to 21 School of Accountancy 
advisory council members of a large public university in the southeastern United States. 
The e-mail requested advisory council members to forward the survey instrument to 
auditors within their firms.  
Forty-three auditor attempts were recorded on the website; 30 auditors completed 
all questions. Of these 30 auditors, three were excluded from the analyses based on their 
recorded time spent viewing task instructions and background information. Pilot testing 
revealed that participants required approximately three minutes to read both the client 
background and financial information, as well as the audit task instructions. Thus, I felt 
confident that participants who spent 60 seconds or less on either of these sections did not 
put forth the effort necessary to understand the task. Consequently, three auditors who 
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spent less than 60 seconds on these sections were excluded from the analyses, leaving 27 
total auditors in the sample.  
 The auditing students were recruited from three undergraduate audit courses at the 
same large public university. The three courses were Audit I, Audit II, and Internal 
Control Auditing. One-hundred and eighty-two attempts were recorded on the website; 
however, only 101 students completed all questions. Of these 101 students, 25 were 
excluded from the analyses because they spent less than 60 seconds viewing either the 
client background and financial information, or the audit task instructions. Finally, one 
student participant was identified as an influential outlier (discussed in Section 4.2.3), 
and was excluded from the analyses. The final sample is depicted below in Table 7.  
 Upon login, participants were randomly assigned to one of the six treatment 
conditions. The web program was designed to fill the treatment cells sequentially to 
enhance the likelihood of obtaining balanced cell sizes. Following the data screening, 
however, the final sample as reflected in Table 6 did not retain balanced cell sizes. This 
can potentially affect the robustness of the statistical analyses, thus the data were 
screened for adherence to the assumptions underlying MANOVA and regression.  
Table 7: Description of Final Sample  
Panel A – Participants Included in Sample 
 Auditors Students 
Total number of recorded survey attempts 43 182 
Total number of incomplete surveys -13 -81 
Total number of participants dropped for insufficient effort -3 -25 
Total number of participants identified as extreme outliers 0 -1 
Total number of participants retained for the analyses 27 75 
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Table 7: Description of Final Sample (continued) 
Panel B – Number of Participants in each Treatment Condition 
 Audit Guidance  
Estimation 
Uncertainty 
Support Oppose Generate Own Total 
 
Low 
A = 6 
S = 11 
C = 17 
A = 3 
S = 12 
C = 15 
A = 6 
S = 14 
C = 20 
A = 15 
S = 37 
C = 52 
 
High 
A = 5 
S = 15 
C = 20 
A = 3 
S = 9 
C = 12 
A = 4 
S = 14 
C = 18 
A = 12 
S = 38 
C = 50 
    
 Total 
A = 11 
S = 26 
C = 37 
A = 6 
S = 21 
C = 27 
A = 10 
S = 28  
C = 38 
 A = 27 
 S = 75 
  C = 102 
A = auditors, S = students, C = combined 
 
 Table 7, Panel A shows that the 27 auditors retained in the sample included 9 
staff, 12 seniors, 4 managers, and 2 partners. Almost half (14) of the auditors worked for 
an international firm. Twelve auditors held a bachelor’s degree in accounting, 13 held a 
master’s degree in accounting, and one auditor held a master’s degree in another field. 
Mean audit experience for the auditors was 5.26 years, while the mean number of times 
that auditors had evaluated a fair value estimate was 2.19 times. This suggests that the 
auditors had relatively little experience in evaluating fair values. On a scale of one to 
nine, where one is not at all knowledgeable and nine is extremely knowledgeable, 
auditors’ mean self-reported fair value knowledge was 4.59.  
Table 7, Panel B shows that the mean work experience for the 75 students 
retained in the sample was 6.77 years and the mean audit experience was 0.18 years, 
indicating that the majority of students had no audit experience. Only one student had 
work experience related to fair values; however, 72 students had taken a college course 
that covered fair value accounting.  
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An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare evidence search time 
for auditors and students. There was no significant difference in minutes of search time 
between auditors (M=6.33, SD=1.73) and students (M=5.74, SD=1.93; t(100)=1.40, 
p=.17). Further, fair value experience was not a significant explanatory variable in the 
analyses.  Based on these factors, participants were combined in the subsequent statistical 
analyses. Additionally, when sample size is small (e.g., n=20), it is possible that a non-
significant result is due to insufficient power (Stevens 2007). Such is the case with the 
auditor participants (n=27). For example, a power analysis revealed that there was only a 
27 percent chance of detecting a main effect of audit guidance on confirmation bias when 
the analyses included only the 27 auditor participants. This percentage increased to 78 
percent when the auditor responses were combined with student responses. Given the 
similarities in search patterns and fair value experience between auditors and students, 
and in the interest of increasing confidence in the results, all participants were combined 
in the analyses. 
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Table 8: Participant Demographics for Confirmation Bias Hypotheses Tests 
Panel A – Descriptive Statistics for Auditor Participants (n=27) 
Evidence Search Time (minutes)   
    Mean  6.33 
    Standard Deviation  1.73 
    Minimum  0.81 
    Maximum  8.79 
Audit Experience (# of years)   
    Mean  5.26 
    Standard Deviation  6.55 
    Minimum  .83 
    Maximum  32 
FV Experience (# of times)   
    Mean  2.19 
    Standard Deviation  2.69 
    Minimum  0 
    Maximum  10 
FV Knowledge (1=not at all knowledgeable,  
                           9=extremely 
knowledgeable) 
  
    Mean  4.59 
    Standard Deviation  1.62 
    Minimum  1 
    Maximum  7 
Firm Size   
    Local  4 
    Regional  6 
    National  3 
    International  14 
Auditor Rank   
    Staff  9 
    Senior  12 
    Manager  4 
    Partner  2 
Highest Education Level*   
    BS/BBA Accounting  12 
    Master of Accounting  13 
    Master – Other  1 
* = 1 missing data point 
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Table 8: Participant Demographics for Confirmation Bias Hypotheses Tests 
(continued) 
Panel B – Descriptive Statistics for Student Participants (n=75) 
Evidence Search Time (minutes)   
    Mean  5.74 
    Standard Deviation  1.93 
    Minimum  0.23 
    Maximum  8.49 
Work Experience (# of years)   
    Mean  6.77 
    Standard Deviation  5.86 
    Minimum  0 
    Maximum  25 
Audit Experience (# of years)   
    Mean  .18 
    Standard Deviation  .66 
    Minimum  0 
    Maximum  5 
Fair Value Work Experience   
    Yes  1 
    No  74 
Fair Value Classroom Experience    
    Yes  72 
    No  3 
 
Two manipulation check questions were included in the survey instrument. The 
first question related to the audit guidance manipulation. This question asked participants 
whether the relevant audit guidance (i.e., audit standards and the firm’s policies) for 
evaluation of the fair value estimated required that the auditor obtain evidence supporting 
management’s assertions, opposing management’s assertions, or develop their own 
independent estimate. Sixty-four percent of total participants answered this question 
correctly (67 percent of auditors and 63 percent of students). Of the 36 percent who 
missed this question, 51 percent were in the “support” condition, 33 percent were in the 
“oppose” condition, and 16 percent were in the “generate own estimate” condition. 
Seventy-seven percent of participants who missed the manipulation check question in the 
“support” and “oppose” conditions selected “generate own” as the correct answer. This 
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evidence supports my suspicion that the placement of the manipulation check question 
within the instrument may have confused participants. Prior to the manipulation check 
question, participants are asked whether they would recommend an adjustment to the 
client’s reported book value for reacquired franchise rights, and if so, for how much. It is 
likely that participants interpreted this question as an instruction to generate their own 
estimate and subsequently answered the manipulation check question with this 
understanding in mind. Given the potential that the manipulation check question was 
unclear, no participants were excluded from the analyses even if they answered the 
manipulation check question incorrectly.  
The second manipulation check question related to the degree of estimation 
uncertainty inherent in the estimate. This question asked participants whether the fair 
value estimate in the task involved low or high uncertainty. Sixty-six percent of total 
participants responded to this question correctly (56 percent of auditors and 70 percent of 
students). Of the 34 percent who answered incorrectly, 80 percent were in the low 
condition while only 20 percent were in the high condition. Further analysis reveals that 
53 percent of participants in the low condition felt that the fair value estimate involved 
high uncertainty. This trend suggests that many of the participants in the low estimation 
uncertainty condition considered the fair value estimate to be highly uncertain, regardless 
of the information provided in the task. This is not an unreasonable perception given that 
the determination of the fair value of an intangible asset is more uncertain than other fair 
value estimates. Additionally, as noted previously, the participants lacked much 
experience with fair value estimation and therefore may have considered the task in 
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general to involve a high level of uncertainty. Given that this manipulation check could 
also be considered unclear, all participants were included in the following analyses. 
4.3 Tests of Confirmation Bias Hypotheses (H1a, H1b, H1c, H1d) 
 Prior to testing the hypotheses, the data were examined for any violations of 
statistical assumptions related to multivariate analysis of variance and linear regression. 
Due to correlations among the dependent variables (discussed in the next section), it was 
determined that multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was an appropriate 
approach for testing Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d. It was also determined that linear 
regression was an appropriate approach for testing Hypotheses 2 and 3 (See Figure 4). 
Following is a description of the preliminary data analyses, as well as detailed 
discussions of the MANOVA and regressions employed to test the hypotheses.   
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Figure 4: Statistical Approach to Testing the Hypotheses 
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4.3.1 Correlation Analyses 
 The approach used to examine correlations depends on whether the dependent 
variables are normally distributed. Analysis of normality (discussed in the next section) 
indicates that the dependent variables are not normally distributed, thus a Spearman rank 
correlation matrix was used to examine correlations. Table 9, which presents the 
Spearman’s rho correlation coefficients for the dependent variables, shows that the 
dependent variables are moderately to highly correlated. This provides support for using 
a multivariate approach to test the confirmation bias hypotheses (H1a, b, c, and d).  
Table 9: Correlation Matrix for the Confirmation Bias Dependent Variables  
Spearman Rank Correlations 
Complete Data Set (n=102) 
 TIMESTD VIEWSTD SAVED 
TIMESTDa 1.000 .787** .556** 
VIEWSTDb  1.000 .646** 
SAVEDc   1.000 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
aTIMESTD = Time spent on supporting evidence minus time spent on opposing evidence 
divided by total time, in seconds 
bVIEWSTD = Number of views of supporting evidence minus number of views of 
opposing evidence divided by total views 
cSAVED = Number of confirming evidence items saved to the electronic work paper file 
minus number of opposing evidence items saved to the electronic work paper file 
 
Correlations between the dependent variables and the potential covariates were 
examined to determine whether any covariates should be included in the analyses. 
Stevens (2007) suggests that covariate variables that are highly correlated (e.g., .80) with 
the dependent variable should be included in the analyses. Examination of the 
Spearman’s rho correlation coefficients revealed that none of the covariates were highly 
correlated with the dependent variables, thus no covariates were included in the tests of 
hypotheses. Descriptive statistics for the potential covariates are presented in Table 10.  
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Table 10: Descriptive Statistics of Potential Covariates 
(n=102) 
 Mean Minimum Maximum Range Standard 
Deviation 
PSTraita 138.86 80 170 90 13.59 
AITraitb 56.77 36 77 41 8.76 
CONFc 5.33 1 9 8 1.79 
RiskPCd 5.96 1 9 8 1.88 
RiskCLe 5.2 2 8 6 1.70 
JUSTIFf 6.61 1 9 8 1.48 
ACCOUNTg 6.14 2 9 7 1.86 
GOALh 19.36 8 25 17 3.54 
aPSTrait = Participants’ general propensity to be skeptical was measured using the Hurtt 
(2007) scale. Scores can range from 30 to180; higher scores equate to greater skepticism. 
bAITrait = Participants’ ambiguity intolerance was measured using the Budner (1962) 
scale. Scores can range from 16 to 112; higher scores indicate a greater intolerance of 
ambiguity. 
cCONF = Participants’ assessment of how confident they feel about their assessment of 
management’s fair value estimate, where 1 = not at all confident and 9 = extremely 
confident. 
dRiskPC = Participants’ assessment of the likelihood that the PCAOB would scrutinize 
the client’s fair value estimate, where 1 = PCAOB would not scrutinize and 9 = PCAOB 
would definitely scrutinize. 
eRiskCL = Participants’ assessment of how risky the client is (compared to the population 
of all possible clients), where 1 = minimum risk and 9 = maximum risk. 
fJUSTIF = Participants’ assessment of how motivated they were to give answers which 
they could justify, where 1 = not at all motivated and 9 = extremely motivated. 
gACCOUNT = Participants’ assessment of the likelihood that someone (e.g., a 
supervisor) would contact them regarding their recommendations related to the client’s 
fair value estimate, where 1 = someone would definitely not contact me and 9 = someone 
would definitely contact me. 
hGOAL = Participants’ assessment of the extent to which they are committed to their 
respective goals outlined in the audit guidance and firm policies. Scores can range from 0 
to 25; higher scores indicate a greater degree of goal commitment. 
 
4.3.2 Tests of Normality 
 Multivariate analysis relies on an assumption that the dependent variables are 
normally distributed (Mendenhall and Sincich 2003). To assess multivariate normality of 
the dependent variables, I first evaluated whether each dependent variable exhibited 
univariate normality. The rationale for testing each dependent variable individually is that 
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if the dependent variables each exhibit univariate normality, then in combination they 
should be normally distributed. To test for univariate normality I used two statistical 
tests: Kolmogorov-Smirnov with Lilliefors significance correction and Shapiro-Wilk. For 
both of these tests, a non-significant result indicates normality. As shown in Table 11, 
only SAVED is normally distributed. These tests, however, may be of limited use as they 
are highly sensitive to minor departures from normality (Mendenhall and Sincich 2003). 
Therefore, I also relied on histograms to assess normality for each of the dependent 
variables. Visual inspection of the data revealed patterns of a bell-shaped curve for each 
of the dependent variables used to measure confirmation bias (TIME, VIEW, and 
SAVED), indicating distributions were relatively normal.   
 Table 11: Tests of Normality for Confirmation Bias Dependent Variables 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
 Statistic df Significance Statistic df Significance 
Depende
nt 
Variable 
      
TIMEb .179 103 .000 .906 103 .000 
VIEWSc .173 103 .000 .847 103 .000 
SAVEDd .116 103 .002 .981 103 .151 
aLilliefors Significance Correction 
bTIME = Time spent viewing confirming evidence minus time spent viewing opposing 
evidence, in seconds 
cVIEWS = Number of views of confirming evidence minus number of views of opposing 
evidence 
dSAVED = Number of confirming evidence items saved to the electronic work paper file 
minus number of opposing evidence items saved to the electronic work paper file 
  
The data were screened for extreme outliers that could affect normality.  
Histograms and box plots revealed 11 potential outliers. Each of these outliers was 
analyzed and it was determined that only one of these outliers was suspect. Further 
screening using Mahalanobis distances corroborated this result, thus, the suspect outlier 
was removed from the analyses, resulting in the final sample of 102, which is used in all 
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analyses. To test the sensitivity of the results to the suspect outlier, the analyses were 
repeated with the outlier and the levels of significance reported were qualitatively similar.    
One option for dealing with any remaining non-normality is to standardize the 
dependent variables. To standardize the TIME variable, I divided the total time spent 
viewing confirming evidence less time spent viewing opposing evidence by the total 
amount of time spent viewing evidence. This new variable was called TIMESTD. I 
applied a similar approach to standardize the VIEW variable. Specifically, I divided the 
total number of views of confirming evidence minus the number of views of opposing 
evidence by the total number of views. This new variable was called VIEWSTD. 
Following these transformations, histograms indicated an improvement in the distribution 
of the data. Visual inspection and the robustness of the methods being used indicates that 
interpretation of the results is not unduly influenced by the remaining non-normality. 
Therefore, the standardized variables are used in the analyses. 
 4.3.3 Homogeneity of Variance-Covariance Matrices 
 The second assumption of MANOVA is the equality of the variance-covariance 
matrices. I used the Box’s M Test to test the null hypothesis that the observed covariance 
matrices of the dependent variables are equal across all groups. A significance value 
above .001 indicates that the assumption is not violated (Pallant 2005, 258). My results 
indicate a significance value of .128, suggesting that the assumption has been met. This 
result should be interpreted with caution, however, because the Box’s M Test relies on 
normality. 
I also used Levene’s test of equality of variances to test the null hypothesis that 
the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. A significance value 
  83 
of less than .05 indicates that the error variances are not equal (Mendenhall and Sincich 
2003). As shown in Table 12, the dependent variables TIMESTD and VIEWSTD violate 
the equality of error variances criteria. An analysis of the variance-covariance matrices 
for TIMESTD and VIEWSTD (untabulated) indicates that stated significance levels 
related to these variables are slightly conservative. According to Hair et al. (1998) if the 
largest variance is associated with the smallest treatment group the power of the test is 
reduced indicating that the alpha is somewhat understated.   
Table 12: Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variances 
 F df1 df2 Sig. 
TIMESTDa 1.720 5 97 .003 
VIEWSTDb 2.187 5 97 .001 
SAVEDc 2.594 5 97 .230 
aTIMESTD = Time spent on supporting evidence minus time spent on opposing evidence 
divided by total time, in seconds 
bVIEWSTD = Number of views of supporting evidence minus number of views of 
opposing evidence divided by total views 
cSAVED = Number of confirming evidence items saved to the electronic work paper file 
minus number of opposing evidence items saved to the electronic work paper file 
 
4.3.4 Additional Considerations for MANOVA 
While not considered assumptions of MANOVA, there are additional issues that 
contribute to the goodness or validity of the MANOVA, including independence of the 
observations, sample size, linearity, and multicollinearity. Each of these is discussed 
below. 
Independence of the observations was achieved by randomly assigning 
participants to one of six treatments. Furthermore, participants completed the survey on 
their own time, minimizing the risk of participants influencing each other in a business or 
classroom setting. 
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Linearity refers to a straight line relationship between each pair of the dependent 
variables. A visual examination of scatterplots indicated that linear relationships were 
present.  
MANOVA is more powerful when the dependent variables are only moderately 
correlated. When the dependent variables are highly correlated, there may be 
multicollinearity problems and one of the dependent variables should be dropped. An 
examination of Pearson correlation coefficients indicates that TIMESTD and VIEWSTD 
are highly correlated (0.906), thus separate ANOVAs will be used to test the robustness 
of the MANOVA in Section 4.3.5.3. 
4.3.5 MANOVA Results 
4.3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 Confirmation bias is measured using three dependent variables: TIMESTD, 
VIEWSTD, and SAVED. The descriptive statistics for these three variables are reported 
below in Tables 13 and 14. Table 13 provides the descriptive statistics for the 
unstandardized dependent variables TIME, VIEWS, and SAVED; whereas, Table 14 
provides descriptive statistics for the standardized values of TIME and VIEWS. The 
standardized values of TIME and VIEWS are used in the subsequent analyses because 
these values more closely adhere to the assumptions of MANOVA.  
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Table 13: Descriptive Statistics of Evidence Viewed and Saved  
Panel A - Means [Medians] (Range) of TIME spent viewing evidence 
 Audit Guidance 
Estimation 
Uncertainty 
Support Oppose Generate Own 
 
Low 
Ca = 198.32 
[205.71] (271) 
Db = 149.17 
[134.28] (261) 
Nc = 49.15  
[28.97] (311) 
n = 17 
C = 138  
[150.97] (254) 
D = 213.53  
[231.38] (378) 
N = -75.53  
[-28.69] (389) 
n = 15 
C = 171  
[163.51] (285) 
D = 172.69  
[160.47] (394) 
N = -1.69  
[-.82] (627) 
n = 20 
 
High 
C = 170.59 
[192.30] (274) 
D = 160.45 
[175.67] (265) 
N = 10.13  
[-2.39] (282) 
n = 20 
C = 141.03  
[160.01] (350) 
D = 236.17  
[241.44] (272) 
N = -95.14  
[-87.39] (561) 
n = 12 
C = 177.67  
[172.98] (198) 
D = 177.61  
[192.66] (286) 
N = 0.06  
[13.06] (278) 
n = 18 
 Panel B - Means [Medians] (Range) of VIEWS of evidence  
 Audit Guidance 
Estimation 
Uncertainty 
Support Oppose Generate Own 
 
Low 
Ca= 14.12 [13.0] (34) 
Db = 9.47 [10.0] (12) 
Nc = 4.63 [1.0] (38)     
n = 17 
C = 8.80 [10.0] (12) 
D = 12.00 [12.0] (17) 
N = -3.20 [-1.0] (23) 
n = 15 
C = 13.30 [13.0] (18) 
D = 13.45 [12.0] (26) 
N = -.15 [0.0] (21) 
n = 20 
 
High 
C = 13.45 [13.5] (17) 
D = 10.50 [12.0] (18) 
N = 4.64 [1.0] (25) 
n = 20 
C = 8.50 [8.5] (16) 
D = 12.25 [12.0] (15) 
N = -3.75 [-2.5] (22) 
n = 12 
C = 13.50 [13.0] (15) 
D = 12.78 [12.5] (16) 
N = 0.72 [1.00] (18) 
n = 18 
Panel C - Means [Medians] (Range) of Evidence SAVED to the Work Paper File 
 Audit Guidance 
Estimation 
Uncertainty 
Support Oppose Generate Own 
 
Low 
Ca = 4.24 [4.0] (10) 
Db = 3.18 [3.0] (9) 
Nc = 1.06 [0.0] (14) 
n = 17 
C = 3.07 [2.0] (11) 
D = 6.40 [6.0] (10) 
N = -3.33 [-4.0] (10) 
n = 15 
C = 4.94 [5.0] (12) 
D = 5.20 [5.00] (12) 
N = -.90 [-2.0] (18) 
n = 20 
 
High 
C = 4.0 [3.0] (11) 
D = 4.60 [5.0] (11) 
N = -0.60 [0.50] (16) 
n = 20 
C = 2.17 [2.5] (4) 
D = 7.0 [6.5] (11) 
N = -4.83 [-4.5] (15) 
n = 12 
C = 4.94 [5.0] (12) 
D = 5.94 [6.0] (12) 
N = -0.83 [-0.50] (10) 
n = 18 
aC = confirming evidence 
bD = disconfirming evidence 
cN = net difference between confirming and disconfirming evidence 
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Table 14: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables by Experimental Condition 
Panel A - Means (Standard Deviations) of Dependent Variable – TIMESTD* 
 Audit Guidance  
Estimation 
Uncertainty 
Support Oppose Generate Own Total 
 
Low 
0.14 
(0.34) 
n = 17 
-0.17 
(0.39) 
n = 15 
0.02 
(0.30) 
n = 20 
0.01 
(0.36) 
n = 52 
 
High 
0.11 
(0.36) 
n = 20 
-0.30 
(0.43) 
n = 12 
0.02 
(0.18) 
n = 18 
-0.02 
(0.36) 
n = 50 
    
 Total 
0.12 
(0.35) 
n = 37 
-0.22 
(0.41) 
n = 27 
0.02 
(0.25) 
n = 38 
-0.01 
(0.36) 
n = 102 
*TIMESTD = Time spent on supporting evidence minus time spent on opposing evidence divided by total 
time, in seconds 
Panel B - Means (Standard Deviations) of Dependent Variable – VIEWSTD**  
 Audit Guidance  
Estimation 
Uncertainty 
Support Oppose Generate Own Total 
 
Low 
0.15 
(0.29) 
n = 17 
-0.16 
(0.32) 
n = 15 
-0.01 
(0.17) 
n = 20 
0.00 
(0.28) 
n = 52 
 
High 
0.16 
(0.29) 
n = 20 
-0.18 
(0.35) 
n = 12 
0.03 
(0.18) 
n = 18 
0.03 
 (0.30) 
n = 50 
    
 Total 
0.16 
(0.29) 
n = 37 
-0.17 
(0.32) 
n = 27 
0.01 
(0.17) 
n = 38 
0.02 
(0.29) 
n = 102 
**VIEWSTD = Number of views of supporting evidence minus number of views of opposing evidence 
divided by total views 
 
The information in Table 13 reveals that participants in the oppose condition 
spent more time looking at disfavoring versus favoring evidence than did participants in 
the support or generate own conditions. These participants also viewed more pieces of 
disfavoring evidence versus favoring evidence than did participants in the support or 
generate own conditions. Following their search strategies, participants in the oppose 
condition also saved more pieces of disfavoring evidence versus favoring evidence in the 
electronic work paper file than did the participants in the support and generate own 
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conditions. Collectively, these patterns suggest that participants in the oppose condition 
exhibited greater bias relative to participants in the support and generate own conditions. 
A second factor influencing participants’ search strategies was the level of 
uncertainty involved in the fair value estimate. As shown in Table 14, the extent of bias 
in the oppose condition was greater when uncertainty was high. Specifically, participants 
in the oppose/high uncertainty condition (1) spent more time viewing disfavoring versus 
favoring evidence, (2) viewed more disfavoring versus favoring items, and (3) saved 
more disfavoring versus favoring items of evidence to the electronic work paper file than 
did participants in the oppose/low uncertainty condition. 
Overall, this evidence suggests that both audit guidance and estimation 
uncertainty affect the extent of bias when evaluating fair value estimates. Specifically, the 
observed patterns of the means indicate that participants in the oppose-high uncertainty 
condition exhibited the greatest bias relative to participants in all other conditions. While 
these descriptive statistics indicate that the means are going in the expected directions, 
the next section presents the formal tests of hypotheses.  
4.3.5.2 Tests of Hypotheses 
 Hypothesis 1a (H1a) predicts that directional audit guidance increases bias in 
auditor evaluation of management’s fair value estimate as the uncertainty associated with 
the estimate increases from a low level to a high level. In other words, H1a predicts an 
interactive effect of directional audit guidance and estimation uncertainty on bias. I use a 
2 x 2 MANOVA to test this hypothesis. The first factor, Audit Guidance, is collapsed into 
two levels: directional audit guidance (support and oppose) and non-directional audit 
guidance (generate own). To form a single level of directional audit guidance, scores for 
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the oppose condition are multiplied by a value of negative one. This transformation in the 
oppose condition is necessary so that the magnitude of bias is not affected by the 
direction of the bias when the two groups (support and oppose) are combined. Following 
the transformation, values closer to zero are representative of a more balanced strategy, 
whereas values further from zero indicate a biased approach evidence evaluation. The 
MANOVA results for the dependent measures are presented in Panel A of Table 15. As 
indicated in Table 15 Panel A, overall H1a (the interaction hypothesis) is not supported 
(F=0.360, p=.782).  Since the MANOVA provides no evidence of an interaction, the 
ANOVA results are not interpreted.    
Table 15: The Overall Effect of Audit Guidance and Estimation Uncertainty on Bias  
Panel A – Multivariate Results 
Independent Variable:  F-Value1 p-value 
Audit Guidance (AG)  3.880 .011 
Estimation Uncertainty (EU)  0.309 .819 
AG x EU  0.360 .782 
Panel B – Univariate Results 
Independent Variable: df SS MS F-Value p-value 
Audit Guidance      
    TIMESTDa 1 .507 .507 4.457 .037 
    VIEWSTDb 1 .545 .545 7.835 .006 
    SAVEDc 1 154.157 154.517 8.106 .005 
Estimation Uncertainty      
    TIMESTDa 1 .003 .003 .030 .863 
    VIEWSTDb 1 .014 .014 .198 .657 
    SAVEDc 1 .000 .000 .001 .977 
AG x EU      
    TIMESTDa 1 .002 .002 .021 .886 
    VIEWSTDb 1 .007 .007 .105 .747 
    SAVEDc 1 .051 .051 .154 .695 
1Wilks’ Lambda 
aTIMESTD = Time spent on supporting evidence minus time spent on opposing evidence 
divided by total time, in seconds 
bVIEWSTD = Number of views of supporting evidence minus number of views of 
opposing evidence divided by total views 
cSAVED = Number of confirming evidence items saved to the electronic work paper file 
minus number of opposing evidence items saved to the electronic work paper file 
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 Although the overall interaction of guidance and uncertainty is not significant, 
hypothesis 1b (H1b) examines differences at the cell level, predicting that the 
combination of disconfirm directional guidance and high uncertainty in management’s 
fair value estimate will result in the greatest bias by auditors when evaluating the 
estimate. Given that the interaction tested in H1a relied on combining support and oppose 
manipulations into a single value, it is possible that the effect of the oppose manipulation 
is being subsumed as a result of the combination.  This possibility is somewhat supported 
by the descriptive statistics reported in Tables 13 and 14.  Therefore, H1b is tested using 
a planned comparison. Results of the planned comparisons indicate that there is a 
statistically significant difference between the oppose/high uncertainty group and all 
other groups for TIMESTD (F(1,96)=1.978, p=.051) and SAVED (F(1,14.423)=3.720, 
p=.002). Inspection of the means supports the prediction that bias is greatest in conditions 
of high uncertainty and disconfirm directional guidance, thus H1b is supported. 
 Hypothesis 1c (H1c) and Hypothesis 1d (H1d) investigate the main effects of 
audit guidance and estimation uncertainty, respectively. H1c predicts that auditors 
presented with directional audit guidance will exhibit a greater magnitude of bias during 
the evidential input phase relative to auditors presented with non-directional audit 
guidance. The overall MANOVA test finds a significant effect of audit guidance 
(F=3.600, p=.016). Results from univariate analysis to determine which dependent 
variables were affected by audit guidance are presented in Table 15, Panel B. As 
indicated in the table, audit guidance was significant for all three dependent variables: 
TIMESTD (F=4.457, p=.037), VIEWSTD (F=7.835, p=.006), SAVED (F=8.381, 
p=.005), thus H1c is supported. 
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 While not predicted, I also examine whether magnitude differences in bias exist 
between the two types of directional audit guidance (support and oppose) and the non-
directional audit guidance (generate own). To test for these differences, I separated the 
audit guidance variable into three levels (support, disconfirm, and generate own) and ran 
a new 3 x 2 MANOVA model with audit guidance and estimation uncertainty as the 
independent variables. In conformance with the results of H1c, the main effect of Audit 
Guidance was significant (Wilks’ Lambda=.718, F=5.652, p=.000). Post hoc tests, 
applying a Bonferroni adjustment, were used to determine where the differences between 
groups occurred for each of the dependent variables. For TIMESTD, oppose was 
significantly different from generate own (p=.054). A review of the means indicates that 
the magnitude of bias was greater for participants in the disconfirm condition (mean =     
-0.22) versus the generate own condition (mean = 0.02). The negative sign in front of the 
mean for the disconfirm condition indicates a conservative bias, signifying that 
participants’ bias was in the direction of disfavoring evidence versus favoring evidence. 
Similarly, for VIEWSTD, oppose was significantly different from generate own (p=.056). 
Again, the means indicate that bias was greater in the disconfirm (mean = -0.17) versus 
generate own (mean = 0.01) condition. Generate own was also significantly different 
from support (mean = 0.16, p=.058), suggesting that participants in the support condition 
exhibited greater confirmation bias than those in the generate own condition. Lastly, for 
SAVED, oppose was significantly different from generate own (p=.000) and support 
(p=.001). Consistent with the results for TIMESTD, bias was greater in the disconfirm 
condition (mean = -4.00) than the generate own condition (mean = -0.89) and the support 
condition (mean = 0.16). Together, these results indicate that audit guidance directing the 
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participant to oppose management’s fair value estimate leads to a greater extent of bias, 
relative to audit guidance directing the participant to either support management’s 
estimate or generate their own estimate. Furthermore, this bias is also a conservative bias 
in that the bias results from a greater emphasis on disfavoring versus favoring evidence.   
 Hypothesis 1d (H1d) predicts that auditors evaluating a fair value estimate 
involving high estimation uncertainty will exhibit a greater magnitude of bias than 
auditors evaluating a fair value estimate involving low estimation uncertainty. Contrary 
to expectations, estimation uncertainty did not affect bias and H1d is not supported 
(p=.529).  
4.3.5.3 Sensitivity Analyses  
 A variety of sensitivity analyses were conducted to test the robustness of the 
results. First, a separate MANOVA was conducted with only the auditor participants to 
enhance the generalizability of the results. The MANOVA revealed non-significant 
results for the effects of both audit guidance and estimation uncertainty on confirmation 
bias. A power analysis revealed that the observed power was insufficient to detect a 
relationship between the independent variables (audit guidance and estimation 
uncertainty) and the dependent variables (TIMESTD, VIEWSTD, and SAVED). As 
discussed in Section 4.2, insufficient power is likely due to the small sample size. 
 Second, supplemental analysis was conducted to determine whether the results are 
driven by participants who did not pass the manipulation checks. The MANOVA 
described in the prior analyses was repeated with only the participants who passed the 
manipulation checks for both audit guidance and estimation uncertainty. The total 
number of participants included in this analysis was 45. The results of the MANOVA 
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indicate that neither audit guidance (F=3.124, p=.321) nor estimation uncertainty 
(F=.079, p=.753) had a statistically significant effect on confirmation bias. These results, 
however, are likely attributable to insufficient power due to the small sample size. 
Specifically, the observed power of the effects of audit guidance and estimation 
uncertainty were 30 percent and 12 percent, respectively. 
 Third, the dependent variables were standardized using different measures to test 
the sensitivity of the results to the construction of the measures. The first measure 
standardized the dependent variables by dividing each observation by 24 which 
represented the total number of different evidence items that participants could view. The 
second measure standardized the dependent variables by dividing each observation by 51 
which represented the highest number of views recorded by a participant. The results of 
the analyses with these alternative measures did not qualitatively differ from those 
reported in Table 15.  
 As discussed previously, MANOVA may have multicollinearity problems when 
the dependent variables are highly correlated. Since TIMESTD and VIEWSTD were 
highly correlated (Pearson correlation = 0.906), three separate analysis of variances 
(ANOVAs) were conducted. Consistent with results of the MANOVA, the separate 
ANOVA results indicate that audit guidance was significant for all three dependent 
variables: TIMESTD (F=4.457, p=.037); VIEWSTD (F=7.835, p=.006), and SAVED 
(F=8.785, p=.004). 
 An alternative approach to dealing with multicollinearity is to create a new 
dependent variable by combining the three dependent variables. Since the dependent 
variables (TIMESTD, VIEWSTD, and SAVED) used different techniques for measuring 
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confirmation bias it was necessary to scale the variables prior to their combination. Once 
scaled and combined, the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of the new variable was .851 
which indicates high internal consistency of the single measure of confirmation bias. An 
ANOVA was run to determine the effects of audit guidance and estimation uncertainty on 
the single measure of confirmation bias. Consistent with the MANOVA, the results 
indicate a significant main effect of audit guidance on confirmation bias (F=9.087, 
p=.003).  
4.4 Tests of Professional Skepticism Hypotheses (H2 and H3) 
 Hypothesis 2 tests whether bias observed during the evidence evaluation phase 
affects skeptical judgment (JUDGE). Specifically, I expect that auditors exhibiting bias 
during the evidential input phase will demonstrate low skeptical judgment while those 
exhibiting conservative bias will demonstrate high skeptical judgment. Recall that 
skeptical judgment is measured by asking participants to assess the risk that 
management’s fair value estimate is materially misstated using a scale of one to nine, 
where one is minimum risk and nine is maximum risk. Using linear regression, I test 
whether each of the measures of confirmation bias (TIMESTD, VIEWSTD, and SAVED) 
leads to skeptical judgment.  
4.4.1 Assumptions of Regression  
Visual inspection of a residuals plot detected a rectangular-shaped pattern, which 
is indicative that the normality assumption has not been violated. An analysis of the 
residual and predicted values indicates that the variances are relatively constant. Multiple 
regression is sensitive to multicollinearity among the independent variables because it 
limits the explanatory ability of these variables. The results of a Pearson correlation 
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analysis, presented in Table 16, reveal that TIMESTD and VIEWSTD are highly 
correlated (r=.906); therefore, the effects of the independent variables on the dependent 
variable (JUDGE) were assessed individually using three different regressions. The 
results of these regressions are presented in Table 17. 
Table 16: Correlation Matrix for the Bias Independent Variables and Skeptical 
Judgment Dependent Variable  
Pearson Correlations (n=102)  
 TIMESTD VIEWSTD SAVED JUDGE 
TIMESTDa 1.000 .906** .574** -.005 
VIEWSTDb  1.000 .598** -.030 
SAVEDc   1.000 -.299** 
JUDGEd    1.000 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
aTIMESTD = Time spent on supporting evidence minus time spent on opposing evidence divided 
by total time, in seconds 
bVIEWSTD = Number of views of supporting evidence minus number of views of opposing 
evidence divided by total views 
cSAVED = Number of confirming evidence items saved to the electronic work paper file minus 
number of opposing evidence items saved to the electronic work paper file 
dJUDGE = Risk that management’s fair value estimate is materially misstated (1= minimum risk 
and 9 = maximum risk) 
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Table 17: Regression Results for Skeptical Judgment 
Panel A: JUDGEa = β0 + β1TIMESTD + ε 
Variable  
Predicted Sign 
Beta 
Coefficient 
 
t-statistic 
 
p-value 
Intercept   28.173 .000 
TIMESTDb - -.005 -.049 .961 
Adjusted R2  -.010   
Panel B: JUDGE = β0 + β1VIEWSTD + ε 
Variable  
Predicted Sign 
Beta 
Coefficient 
 
t-statistic 
 
p-value 
Intercept   28.169 .000 
VIEWSTDc - -.030 -.298 .766 
Adjusted-R2  -.009   
Panel C: JUDGE = β0 + β1SAVED + ε 
Variable  
Predicted Sign 
Beta 
Coefficient 
 
t-statistic 
 
p-value 
Intercept   27.331 .000 
SAVEDd - -.299 -3.129 .002 
Adjusted-R2  .080   
aJUDGE = Risk that management’s fair value estimate is materially misstated (1= minimum risk 
and 9 = maximum risk) 
bTIMESTD = Time spent on supporting evidence minus time spent on opposing evidence divided 
by total time, in seconds 
cVIEWSTD = Number of views of supporting evidence minus number of views of opposing 
evidence divided by total views 
dSAVED = Number of confirming evidence items saved to the electronic work paper file minus 
number of opposing evidence items saved to the electronic work paper file 
 
4.4.2 Test of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that skeptical judgment is affected when auditors exhibit 
bias during the evidential input phase. The results of the regressions indicate that only the 
SAVED measure of bias was a significant explanatory variable of skeptical judgment (t=-
3.129, p=.002). The significant negative coefficient suggests that when auditors are 
required to make a decision regarding the evidence they would save in a work paper file 
to justify their actions, this behavior subsequently affects their skeptical judgment. 
Interestingly, auditors’ search processes (i.e., TIMESTD and VIEWSTD) do not 
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influence their skeptical judgment; rather, the requirement to “save” their evidence is the 
influential factor on skeptical judgment.  
 The negative coefficient for SAVED suggests that there is an inverse relationship 
between bias and skeptical judgment. In other words, as confirmation bias increases, the 
level of skeptical judgment decreases. Of further interest in this study is whether 
conservative bias (e.g., confirmation bias which favors disconfirming evidence versus 
confirming evidence) increases skeptical judgment. Since confirmation bias in the 
disconfirm condition is identified by a negative number, the inverse relationship suggests 
that as conservative bias increases, the level of skeptical judgment increases. In summary, 
these results provide only partial support for H2 since only the SAVED measure of bias 
influenced skeptical judgment.   
 Hypothesis 3 (H3) predicts that auditors’ skeptical judgment leads to skeptical 
action.  Skeptical action was measured by the participant’s recommended dollar 
adjustment to the client’s reported book value for the reacquired franchise rights. A 
downward adjustment is evidence of skeptical action (ACTION).  
To test H3, regression analysis was performed using the following model: 
ACTION = β0 + β1JUDGE + ε. The results, reported in Table 18, indicate that as 
predicted, skeptical action is influenced by skeptical judgment (t=-.3472, p=.001). Recall 
that a downward adjustment is indicative of skeptical action, thus the negative Beta 
coefficient supports the directional prediction that skeptical judgment leads to skeptical 
action, thus H3 is supported. 
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Table 18: Regression Results for Skeptical Action  
Model: ACTIONa = β0 + β1JUDGE + ε 
Variable  
Predicted Sign 
Beta 
Coefficient 
 
t-statistic 
 
p-value 
Intercept   2.058 .042 
JUDGEb - -.328 -.3472 .001 
Adjusted R2  .099   
aACTION = Skeptical action measured by the amount of recommended dollar adjustment 
to management’s reported book value for reacquired franchise rights.  
bJUDGE = Skeptical judgment measured as the risk that management’s fair value 
estimate is materially misstated (1= minimum risk and 9 = maximum risk) 
 
4.4.3 Sensitivity Tests 
Visual inspection of scatterplots for JUDGE indicated some slight 
heteroscedasticity. Rank regressions, which are fairly robust to heteroscedasticity, were 
utilized to test H2 and the results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 17. 
Visual inspections of histograms and scatterplots for ACTION indicated that the data 
were not normally distributed and that this pattern was driven by a high concentration of 
data points at zero. Further examination of the data revealed that 21 participants (72 
percent) elected not to make an adjustment to management’s fair value estimate and four 
participants (four percent) made upward adjustments to management’s estimate. 
Although regression is robust to departures from normality, a rank regression was used to 
test the robustness of the results.11
Ideally, additional statistical techniques such as covariance-based structural 
equation modeling (SEM) would be employed to test the entire model. Structural 
equation modeling techniques may be a more powerful statistical method for testing the 
hypothesis as those techniques allow for testing of all the relationships in the model 
 Results of the rank regression are significant at a p-
value of .000, consistent with the results reported in Table 18.  
                                                 
11 For the rank regression, upward dollar adjustments to management’s fair value estimate were interpreted 
as non-skeptical judgment and were accordingly recoded as zero values. 
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including direct and indirect effects of variables. However, these techniques generally 
require very large sample sizes to render a specified model. Loehlin (1992) summarizes 
results from studies which examined the effects of sample sizes on accuracy of estimation 
and frequency of improper or nonconvergent models. Loehlin reports that with samples 
of 100 or less, models experienced convergence failures, improper solutions (e.g., 
negative estimates of residual variance), and less precise estimates of the population 
values. Loehlin recommends the use of 200 cases and at least three indicators per factor. 
Similarly, Chin and Newsted (1999) warn that “when the latent variates are dependent, fit 
indices tend to overreject models at sample sizes of 250 or less” (Hu and Bentler 1995, 
95). Further, they warn that small sample sizes have the potential for Type II error in 
which a poor model falsely achieves a good model fit and that small samples can lead to 
poor parameter estimates and model test statistics (Chin and Newsted 1999).  
An alternative to covariance-based SEM analysis is the variance-based approach 
of partial least squares (PLS). Claims have been made that PLS can be a powerful method 
of analysis when sample size is small. However, Monte Carlo studies have demonstrated 
that this is not the case (Goodhue et al. 2007). Furthermore, “PLS shifts the orientation 
from causal model/theory testing to component-based predictive modeling” (Chin and 
Newsted 1999, 312). In other words, the goal of SEM is to obtain population parameter 
estimates for explaining covariances under the assumption that the model is correct. On 
the other hand, the goal of PLS is to create latent variable scores that can be used to 
predict its own indicators or other latent variable (Chin and Newsted 1999).Given that the 
goal of my study involves theory testing (i.e., Motivated Reasoning Theory) and causal 
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model testing (i.e., Nelson’s Professional Skepticism Model), PLS was not employed in 
this context.   
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
5.1 Conclusions  
Using professional auditors and undergraduate auditing students, this study 
examined the effects of audit guidance and estimation uncertainty on auditor judgment 
and decision making in a fair value setting. The study predicted that directional audit 
guidance and estimation uncertainty would individually and jointly affect confirmation 
bias and, subsequently, professional skepticism when evaluating fair value estimates. 
Following motivated reasoning theory, it was expected that directional audit guidance 
(support/oppose management’s estimate) would lead the auditor to engage in greater bias 
than non-directional audit guidance (generate own estimate). Further, according to 
theories of ambiguity intolerance and negativity bias, it was expected that estimation 
uncertainty would exacerbate this bias. Lastly, following Nelson’s (2009) professional 
skepticism model, bias in evidential input was predicted to affect professional skepticism. 
The findings support aspects of these expectations. The effects of both directional audit 
guidance and estimation uncertainty on bias and, subsequently, professional skepticism 
are summarized below.  
Hypotheses 1a and 1b examined the joint effects of directional audit guidance and 
estimation uncertainty on auditor confirmation bias. Specifically, H1a predicted that 
directional audit guidance increases auditor bias in the evaluation of management’s fair 
value estimate as the uncertainty in the estimate increases from a low level to a high 
level. The interaction effect between audit guidance and estimation uncertainty predicted 
in H1a was not supported. This result suggests that audit guidance and estimation 
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uncertainty do not work in concert to affect confirmation bias; however, their joint effect 
may have been masked by the method used to test the hypothesis. For instance, H1a 
relied on combining the two levels of directional guidance (support and oppose) into a 
single level, and it is possible that the differences at the individual cell levels were 
masked by this combination of directional audit guidance into one level. Thus, H1b 
examined differences in the individual cells. Specifically, H1b predicted that bias would 
be greatest when audit guidance directed the auditor to disconfirm management’s 
estimate and estimation uncertainty was high. H1b focuses on the disconfirm and high 
uncertainty condition as this cell is expected to exhibit the greatest magnitude of 
conservative bias, which would presumably alleviate concerns regarding the auditor’s 
propensity to agree with management’s potentially biased estimate. Results support H1b 
for the TIMESTD and SAVED bias variables, implying that participants were more 
prone to exhibit bias in the time spent viewing evidence and the evidence saved to the 
work paper file when they were directed to disconfirm management’s estimate and 
estimation uncertainty was high. This bias was a conservative bias, in that participants 
emphasized more opposing evidence than supporting evidence. This result has 
implications for standard setters and practitioners who express concern over confirmatory 
proneness in auditors as they evaluate fair value estimates of varying degrees of 
uncertainty. Specifically, this result indicates that directional guidance focusing on 
opposing management’s reported fair value estimate can shift the auditor’s focus from 
supporting evidence to disconfirming evidence when estimation uncertainty is high.   
While an interaction effect is detected in H1b, it remains of interest to investigate 
whether audit guidance and estimation uncertainty individually affect bias in auditor 
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review of fair value estimates. For example, the effects of directional audit guidance may 
have implications for the review of fair value estimates, irrespective of the level of 
uncertainty involved in the estimate reviewed. This information could be informative to 
standard setters and firms who develop guidance for auditors via formal standards and 
less formal practice guides. 
H1c examined the individual main effect of audit guidance. Specifically, H1c 
predicted that auditors presented with directional audit guidance would exhibit a greater 
magnitude of bias than auditors presented with non-directional guidance. To test this 
hypothesis, the two levels of directional guidance (i.e., support/oppose management’s 
estimate) were combined into one level and then compared to the level of non-directional 
guidance (e.g., generate own estimate). This main effect of audit guidance was supported 
for all three dependent variables: TIMESTD (measured as the time spent on supporting 
evidence minus time spent on opposing evidence divided by total time), VIEWSTD 
(measured as the number of views of supporting evidence minus number of views of 
opposing evidence divided by total views), and SAVED (measured as the number of 
confirming evidence items minus number of opposing evidence items saved to an 
electronic work paper file). While this finding supports H1c, it does not provide 
information about which type of directional audit guidance leads to the greatest bias. A 
review of the means in each guidance condition indicates a conservative bias in the 
disconfirm condition. Post hoc analyses confirm that bias in the oppose condition was 
greater than the degree of bias in the generate own condition for all three dependent 
variables. In addition, bias in the support condition was greater than the degree of bias in 
the generate own condition for only VIEWSTD. In summary, these findings suggest that 
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bias is greatest when audit guidance directs the auditor to oppose management’s estimate 
and that this bias shifts the auditors’ search strategy from a confirming approach to a 
more conservative approach that emphasizes disconfirming evidence. Further, little 
difference was found between audit guidance directing the auditor to support 
management’s estimate and guidance directing the auditor to generate their own estimate. 
Collectively, these results suggest that requiring an auditor to generate his or her own 
estimate may not be an effective remedy for decreasing bias in auditors; however, 
requiring an auditor to oppose management’s estimate shifts the bias to a conservative 
bias. Thus, constituents such as the PCAOB who are interested in increasing auditor 
professional skepticism during the audit of fair value estimates may view the instruction 
to disconfirm management’s estimate as a vehicle to heighten skepticism via this 
conservative bias. This possibility was explored further in H2 and H3, but first the main 
effect of estimation uncertainty is discussed.  
H1d predicted that auditors evaluating a fair value estimate involving high 
uncertainty would exhibit a greater magnitude of bias than auditors evaluating a fair 
value estimate involving low estimation uncertainty. This hypothesis was not supported. 
Given the uncertain nature of fair value estimation in general, and the low levels of fair 
value experience represented in the sample of participants, it is possible that the 
uncertainty manipulation was not salient to participants. In other words, auditors may 
perceive little difference in levels of uncertainty when dealing with a fair value estimate 
involving many assumptions, even when those assumptions involve differences in 
uncertainty. Interestingly, interviews with partners at Big Four firms indicated that 
auditors become involved in fair value auditing as early as the staff level, and it is 
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possible that early in their careers, auditors will perceive fair value auditing as an 
ambiguous task, regardless of the actual degree of uncertainty inherent in the estimate. 
Further research with a more select sample of auditors will provide more insight into the 
effects of estimation uncertainty on confirmation bias. For example, a sample including 
auditors at both low levels (e.g., staff) and high levels (e.g., partners) may provide insight 
into whether experience influences auditors’ perceptions of and reactions to varying 
levels of estimation uncertainty. A larger sample may also detect differences that were 
not observed in this study because of low statistical power.   
Overall, the results of H1a, b, c, and d should be of interest to standard setters and 
accounting firms as they consider the development of guidance for evaluating fair value 
estimates. Although bias is generally considered to be a deficiency in judgment and 
decision making (JDM) it is possible that bias (e.g., conservative bias) can have positive 
effects on other aspects of the audit, including auditors’ professional skepticism. 
Accordingly, Hypotheses 2 and 3 investigated the effects of confirmation (conservative) 
bias on auditor professional skepticism. 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that auditors’ bias during the evidential input phase would 
affect auditors’ skeptical judgment. This hypothesis was partially supported as only one 
of the measures of bias (i.e. SAVED) was significant. This finding suggests that when 
auditors are required to make a decision regarding which pieces of evidence to save in a 
work paper file as support for their recommendations, bias exhibited in the saving process 
affects auditors’ skeptical judgment. This relationship makes intuitive sense as judgment 
is inherently involved in making a decision to save to the work paper file. However, it 
raises the question of whether there is a recursive relationship between actions taken 
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during the evidential input phase and skeptical judgment. This study finds that auditor 
bias in evidence saved to the work paper file affects auditors’ skeptical judgment. Thus, 
auditors exhibiting confirmation (conservative) bias exercise lower (higher) skeptical 
judgment. This finding, when combined with the results of H1c, suggests that directional 
audit guidance directing the auditor to oppose management’s estimate can increase 
conservative bias in the evidential input phase, thereby increasing skeptical judgment in 
the evaluation of fair value estimates.  
Hypothesis 3 examines whether skeptical judgment leads to skeptical action.  
Consistent with Nelson’s (2009) professional skepticism model, this hypothesis is 
supported. Collectively, H2 and H3 provide evidence that confirmation bias can have a 
positive effect on auditors’ professional skepticism. Specifically, auditors exhibit 
conservative bias, wherein the auditor focuses on more disfavoring than favoring 
evidence, and professional skepticism is elevated. Together, the findings of this study 
provide evidence toward Nelson’s (2009) call for research investigating whether 
confirmation bias can be exploited to increase professional skepticism. Based on the 
results of this study, directional audit guidance, which orients the auditor towards a 
disconfirming approach, leads to higher professional skepticism in the evaluation of fair 
value estimates.   
5.2 Contributions 
The findings of this study have important implications for standard setters and 
audit firms as they develop guidance for the audit of fair value estimates. Much of the 
debate regarding the veracity of fair value reporting rests on the auditor’s ability to 
provide assurance as to the representational faithfulness of the estimate. This study 
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provides evidence that current audit guidance directing an auditor to support 
management’s fair value estimates leads to a confirmation bias, wherein the auditor 
favors supporting versus disconfirming evidence. Further, this confirmation bias leads to 
decreased professional skepticism. This finding validates opponents’ concerns that fair 
value reporting could result in misstated fair values if management’s estimate is biased. 
The results also show that non-directional guidance telling the auditor to generate his or 
her own estimate leads to a less biased search than either of the directional guidance 
conditions (e.g., support or disconfirm management’s estimate). This finding is consistent 
with motivated reasoning theory, and offers the profession insight when considering the 
effects of alternative wording in audit guidance on auditor bias.   
This study also directly answers a call for research in the professional skepticism 
literature. Nelson (2009) urges researchers to investigate whether confirmation bias can 
be exploited to increase professional skepticism in auditors. As predicted, this study 
provides evidence that confirmation bias can be used to favor professional skepticism by 
changing the focus of directional guidance from a confirming focus to a disconfirming 
focus. Specifically, when auditors are directed to oppose management’s estimate, they 
exhibit a conservative bias, wherein they favor disconfirming evidence over confirming 
evidence, and this bias increases professional skepticism. These results, however, do not 
provide information regarding the effects of confirmation (conservative) bias on the 
efficiency of the audit. Thus, standard setters and audit firms should consider the results 
in combination with other objectives of the audit. Further, the results are subject to 
limitations that are inherent in the experimental approach. These limitations are discussed 
in section 5.3. 
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The findings of this study also have implications for judgment and decision 
making research. Bonner (2008) suggests that judgment and decision research should 
extend beyond the study of judgment biases and should also identify remedies for such 
biases or situations where the bias can have positive effects on JDM. This study extends 
judgment and decision making research by providing an example of how confirmation 
bias can be optimized to have positive effects on auditors’ skeptical judgment and 
skeptical action. The question remains, however, whether professional skepticism can 
actually be heightened to an extent that it leads to an inefficient audit. Additionally, the 
implications of this study are predicated on the potential for management’s fair value 
estimates to be biased. In other words, if management’s estimates are in fact reliable, then 
it could be argued that a confirmation bias would lead to a more efficient audit. The 
weakness in this argument is that the auditor does not know a priori whether 
management’s estimate is reliable, thus exercising professional skepticism in the audit of 
the fair value estimate is critical. 
5.3 Limitations 
 Due to the experimental approach utilized in the study, this research is subject to a 
number of limitations. First, to increase the internal validity of the study, the fair value 
task excluded additional information typically available to auditors when making fair 
value judgments. It is therefore possible that additional factors may be present in the 
auditing environment which would either mitigate or exacerbate the effects of 
confirmation bias on professional skepticism.  
Second, it is likely that the manipulation of estimation uncertainty was not salient 
to the participants. While pilot testing provided evidence that the manipulation was 
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effective, only 66 percent of participants passed the manipulation check in the main 
experiment. Given the nature of the experiment (i.e., fair value estimation of a Level 3 
fair value), it is likely that even the low uncertainty condition was perceived as a highly 
uncertain situation for participants. Additionally, the experimental materials provided 
sensitivity ranges reflecting management’s consideration of alternative assumptions or 
outcomes. The range for the low uncertainty condition provided a spread of $5,124,500 
which represented nearly 24 percent of the total fair value estimate. Thus, it is possible 
that this range was too large and that participants perceived the estimate as one that 
involved high uncertainty. These issues potentially suggest that the results of the 
experiment may not be representative of real differences in confirmation bias which may 
exist between fair values of low versus high uncertainty. 
Third, the small sample size may have contributed to low power in the statistical 
approaches utilized. A larger sample would allow for more powerful statistical techniques 
such as structural equation modeling to be utilized. Structural equation modeling has the 
advantage of testing all of the relationships in the model including direct and indirect 
effects of the constructs within the model. This approach would provide more compelling 
evidence regarding the total effects of audit guidance and estimation uncertainty on both 
confirmation bias and professional skepticism exercised in the audit of fair value 
estimates. 
Last, participants may have lacked the knowledge necessary to make fair value 
judgments. While interviews with partners from Big Four firms and regional firms 
revealed that even staff auditors are involved in the audit of fair values, the 
demographical analysis indicated that participants had very little (if any) experience with 
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auditing fair values. This factor might explain why so few participants recommended an 
adjustment to management’s fair value estimate. In other words, participants may have 
opted not to make an adjustment to management’s fair value estimate out of convenience 
because of a lack of confidence in their own fair value knowledge. Further research is 
needed to determine whether this lack of experience was an artifact of the students and 
auditors included in the sample, or whether it is representative of the lack of knowledge 
and confidence held by auditors in general. Post-experimental discussions with 
professional auditors and valuators suggest that the audit profession as a whole is lacking 
confidence and experience in fair value judgments.   
5.4 Future Research 
 The results of this study provide avenues for future research in the area of auditor 
judgment and decision making as it relates to the evaluation of fair value estimates. 
Auditors commonly face countervailing incentives during an audit engagement, including 
the requirement to comply with auditing standards, and time pressures to complete the 
audit efficiently. While the results of my study indicate that directional audit guidance 
increases professional skepticism when it shifts the focus of the auditors’ search from a 
confirmatory to a disconfirmatory approach, it is possible that this shift leads to an 
inefficient audit. A future extension of my study includes an examination of the overall 
differences in time spent viewing evidence to determine whether directional guidance and 
estimation uncertainty affect the overall efficiency of the audit. Similarly, while the 
primary purpose of this study was not to determine the optimal level of professional 
skepticism, future research could investigate the effects of total search time on 
professional skepticism.  
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 Bonner (2008) suggests that auditors may be less susceptible to confirmation bias 
during the information search phase because their requirements to exercise professional 
skepticism may make them focus more on negative information. Thus, it is possible that 
there is in fact a recursive relationship in Nelson’s (2009) professional skepticism model 
wherein skeptical judgment influences evidential input. Future analyses could investigate 
whether skeptical judgment influences evidence search. In addition, it is possible that 
audit guidance and estimation uncertainty affect professional skepticism, irrespective of 
evidence search. Future path analyses could investigate the direct and indirect links 
between audit guidance, estimation uncertainty, bias in evidential search, and 
professional skepticism.    
 Future research could also investigate whether the source of evidence influences 
auditors’ professional skepticism when evaluating fair value estimates. In other words, a 
study could be designed to determine the relative weights that auditors give to internally-
generated evidence versus externally-generated evidence when making fair value 
judgments and decisions. Similarly, future research could investigate whether auditors’ 
decisions are influenced when a valuation specialist is involved in reviewing the estimate 
and whether judgments and decisions are influenced by whether the specialist is 
employed by the client versus the audit firm. Further, future research could investigate 
whether differences in auditor JDM emerge when the auditor reviews quantitative versus 
qualitative evidence.  
  Finally, various covariates supported by theory and prior research were included 
in the study; however, none proved to be significant explanatory variables of 
confirmation bias as expected. Future research should seek to explain why covariates that 
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have been shown to affect auditor behavior in situations of uncertainty did not influence 
auditor JDM in a fair value setting.   
 Through exploring some of the suggestions discussed above, researchers will gain 
further insight into the direct and indirect effects of confirmation (conservative) bias on 
professional skepticism, as well as other aspects of the audit. These future studies could 
further enhance our understanding of the effects of bias and professional skepticism on 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the audit, as these areas were not touched on by the 
results of this study.   
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APPENDIX A: PROFESSIONAL SKEPTICISM SCALE 
Skepticism Scale and Instructions for administration (Hurtt 2007) 
Statements that people use to describe themselves are given below. Please circle the response  
that indicates how you generally feel. There are no right or wrong answers.  Do not spend too  
much time on any one statement.  
 Strongly Strongly 
 Disagree  Agree 
I often accept other peoples’ explanations without  
 further thought. ..................................................................... 1 2 3 4 5 6   
I feel good about myself. .......................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 
I wait to decide on issues until I can get more information ...1 2 3 4 5 6 
The prospect of learning excites me. .....................................1 2 3 4 5 6 
I am interested in what causes people to behave  
the way that they do ......................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 
I am confident of my abilities ................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 
I often reject statements unless I have proof that they are  
 true ................................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 
Discovering new information is fun ......................................1 2 3 4 5 6 
I take my time when making decisions .................................. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
I tend to immediately accept what other people tell me ........1 2 3 4 5 6   
Other peoples’ behavior doesn’t interest me .........................1 2 3 4 5 6   
I am self-assured ....................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 
My friends tell me that I usually question things that I see  
 or hear ...........................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 
I like to understand the reason for other peoples’ behavior ...1 2 3 4 5 6 
I think that learning is exciting ..............................................1 2 3 4 5 6 
I usually accept things I see, read or hear at face value .........1 2 3 4 5 6   
I don’t feel sure of myself ......................................................1 2 3 4 5 6   
I usually notice inconsistencies in explanations ....................1 2 3 4 5 6 
Most often I agree with what the others in my group think ...1 2 3 4 5 6   
I dislike having to make decisions quickly ............................1 2 3 4 5 6 
I have confidence in myself ...................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 
I don’t like to decide until I’ve looked at all of the readily  
available information ....................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 
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 Strongly Strongly 
 Disagree  Agree 
 
I like searching for knowledge ...............................................1 2 3 4 5 6 
I frequently question things that I see or hear ........................1 2 3 4 5 6 
It is easy for other people to convince me .............................1 2 3 4 5 6   
I seldom consider why people behave in a certain way .........1 2 3 4 5 6   
I like to ensure that I’ve considered most available  
 information before making a decision ..........................1 2 3 4 5 6 
I enjoy trying to determine if what I read or hear is true .......1 2 3 4 5 6 
I relish learning ......................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 
The actions people take and the reasons for those actions 
are fascinating ...............................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Skepticism Scale Instructions: 
 
This is a 30 item scale that normally takes less than 5 minutes to administer.  I normally 
explain that the scale is used to measure differences in individual characteristics and that 
there are no right or wrong answers. 
 
Items 1, 10, 11, 16, 17, 19, 25, 26 are reverse scored. (Subtract the score from 7 and use 
the reversed number in summing the total score.) 
 
Scale scores can range from 30 – 180.  Student scores have tended to fall within the 90 – 
150 range and higher scores equate to greater skepticism. 
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APPENDIX B: AMBIGUITY INTOLERANCE SCALE 
Ambiguity Intolerance Scale and Scoring Instructions (Budner 1962) 
 
Please respond to the following statements by indicating the extent to which you agree or 
disagree with them.    
           Strongly        Strongly  
           Disagree   Agree  
An expert who doesn’t come up with a definite answer  
 probably doesn’t know much. ........................................1 2 3 4 5 6   7 
I would like to live in a foreign country for a while ..............1 2 3 4 5 6   7 
There is really no such thing as a problem that can’t  
 be solved. ......................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6   7 
People who fit their lives to a schedule probably miss  
most of the joy of living ................................................1 2 3 4 5 6   7 
A good job is one where what is to be done and how it  
 is to be done is always clear ..........................................1 2 3 4 5 6   7 
It is more fun to tackle a complicated problem than to  
 solve a simple one .........................................................1 2 3 4 5 6   7 
In the long run it is possible to get more done by tackling  
 small simple problems rather than large and  
 complicated ones. ..........................................................1 2 3 4 5 6   7 
Often the most interesting and stimulating people are  
 those who don’t mind being different and original. ...... 1 2 3 4 5 6   7 
What we are used to is always preferable to what is  
 unfamiliar. .....................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6   7 
People who insist upon a yes or no answer just don’t know  
 how complicated things really are. ...............................1 2 3 4 5 6   7 
A person who leads an even, regular life in which few  
 surprises or unexpected happening arise really has  
 a lot to be grateful for....................................................1 2 3 4 5 6   7 
Many of our most important decisions are based upon  
 insufficient information. ...............................................1 2 3 4 5 6   7 
I like parties where I know most of the people more  
 than ones where all or most of the people are  
 complete strangers. .......................................................1 2 3 4 5 6   7 
Teachers and supervisors who hand out vague assignments 
 give one a chance to show initiative and originality. ....1 2 3 4 5 6   7 
The sooner we all acquire similar values and ideals the  
 better. ............................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6   7 
A good teacher or supervisor is one who makes you  
 wonder about your way of looking at things. ...............1 2 3 4 5 6   7 
 
Scoring Instructions: The even numbered items must be reverse-scored. The sum of all 16 
items represents the total score. High scores indicate a greater intolerance of ambiguity.            
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 APPENDIX C: EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS 
 
Experimental Condition: Oppose Management’s Estimate/High Estimation 
Uncertainty 
 
Dear auditor:        eIRB#: ( Pro00000980 ) 
 
 
My name is Norma Montague and I am a Ph.D. student in the School of Accountancy at 
the University of South Florida. I would like to request your participation in a research 
study related to “Auditing Fair Value Estimates.” This research is extremely timely can 
help advance knowledge in both the academic and audit areas. This research study is 
being conducted as part of my dissertation and I would really appreciate your 
participation in the study. 
 
To participate, I will ask you to evaluate an issue pertaining to a hypothetical public 
client’s intangible asset account. You will be asked to evaluate the client’s fair value 
estimate for the intangible asset by reviewing the client’s assumptions as well as evidence 
available to the client when making the assumptions. 
 
The case should take no more than 30 minutes. Your participation is voluntary and your 
identity will be kept confidential.  
 
Below is a link to the study. It will be necessary for you to use Internet Explorer as your 
browser in order to access the study.  
 
Please enter the following access code on the initial screen.  
 
Access Code: pyr921 
 
Entering this access code and proceeding past the initial screen indicates consent to 
participate in the study.  
 
If you have any questions, please direct your requests to: 
 
 Norma R. Montague 
 University of South Florida 
 4202 E. Fowler Avenue, BSN 3403 
 Tampa, Florida 33620 
 (813) 974-7340 
 nmontagu@usf.edu 
 
 
Link to Study:  http://forecast-study.com/research/ 
 
Thank you for your participation! 
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The Audit Task was varied to reflect the various experimental conditions as follows: 
 
Support Management’s Estimate/Low Uncertainty Condition: 
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Oppose Management’s Estimate/Low Uncertainty Condition: 
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Generate Own Estimate/Low Uncertainty Condition: 
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Support Management’s Estimate /High Uncertainty Condition: 
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Generate Own Estimate/High Uncertainty Condition: 
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Evidence items in the Low Uncertainty Condition: 
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The student participant survey was identical to the auditor participant survey with the 
exception of the two following screens: 
 
Student Survey: Introduction Page 
 
 
 
Student survey: Demographical questions 
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